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FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDED IN
PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS
Paul C. Feinberg*
The status of punitive damages for purposes of federal income
taxation is unclear, particularly in light of a recent amendment to
the Internal Revenue Code distinguishing punitive damages for
physical injuries from those for non-physical injuries. The author
considers whether or not punitive damages for personal injuries
are excluded from income under section 104(a)(2). Employing an
historical analysis of section 104(a)(2) and reviewing the nature of
various types of damages, the author concludes that Congress did
not intend to exclude punitive damages from income.
I. INTRODUCION
In recent years federal income taxation of punitive damages
awarded in personal injury cases has become the subject of much
controversy in administrative practice, in the courts, in Congress
and in academia. In fact, this area of income tax law is filled with
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nary research for this article was conducted. The author also wishes to thank Gretchen
Fleischut-Barmann, an associate at Polsinelli, White, Vardeman & Shalton for her invalu-
able assistance in the preparation of this article, as well as Jim Grice and Patricia Richter
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such a variety of differing and contrasting viewpoints that any
attempt at harmonizing them is daunting. The large number of
opinions alone so obscures the debate that any effort to provide a
clear interpretation of the treatment of punitive damages makes the
task arduous and complicated. Despite these difficulties, this article
seeks to provide a coherent understanding of how punitive damages
should be treated for federal income tax purposes.
This article begins by first examining the current debate sur-
rounding punitive damages.' After presenting the various
viewpoints on the subject, Section III of the article analyzes the
nature of the different types of tort damages awards.2 This close
examination of the various types of damages provides a solid foun-
dation upon which to examine how federal tax law has dealt with
puntie damages since 1916.
Section IV reviews the origins of the treatment of damages
under federal tax law.3 It considers carefully the earliest adminis-
trative interpretations of damage awards. Those decisions disclose
that prior to the enactment of section 104,4 the tax treatment of
personal injury awards was not entirely clear. The article proceeds
to analyze the first statutory exemption for personal injury damages
in an effort to resolve many of the current issues. Next, section V5
examines the exclusion in the context of the Supreme Court's
redefinition of income in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass.6 Sec-
tion VI reviews cases and Service rulings interpreting personal
injury for tax purposes.' This section provides further context for
understanding the manner in which the exclusion for punitive dam-
ages fits with other areas of tax. Section VII discusses more recent
judicial decisions regarding the status of punitive damages.!
This article concludes that the most plausible analysis of sec-
tion 104(a)(2) is that Congress intended to exclude from gross
income only those amounts received as compensation for personal
injury, i.e., receipts which restore the taxpayer to his or her prior
condition. Congress did not intend to exclude from gross income,
and the Internal Revenue Code's exemption of damage awards does
1. See infra text accompanying notes 13-41 (Section II).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 42-84.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 85-161.
4. I.R.C. § 104 (West Supp. 1992).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 162-72.
6. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 173-265.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 266-366.
[Vol. 42:339
TAXATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
not reach, punitive damages payments which serve some function
other than compensating persons for injury. To reach these conclu-
sions, this article employs historical analysis. A view of the exclu-
sion which accounts for the traditional goals and purposes of vari-
ous types of tort damages provides useful guidance for determining
the taxable status of punitive damages. Accordingly, this article
uses the prior enactments of section 104(a)(2) and interpretations of
those earlier acts to construe the present statute.
This method of historical analysis presupposes the continuing
vitality of objectives and intentions embodied in earlier versions of
the statute. Prior enactments of a statute help explain the purposes
behind a current statute.9 Where phrases or blocks of language are
adapted from earlier statutes, Congress is presumed to intend the
same meaning.1° Furthermore, if a section is merely renumbered,
no intent to change the meaning of the statute is to be inferred.1
9. See I JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATON; §§ 104,
108 (1991). "Legislative history includes the process by which a statutory section evolved.
Thus, the language of previous statutes can be useful in interpreting current law." Id
§ 108.
10. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) ("[Where, as here, Congress
adopts a new law which incorporates sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be
presumed to have knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least
insofar as it affects the new statute."); Eli Lilly v. EPA, 615 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. Ind.
1985) ('Congress is presumed to be aware of a judicial interpretation of a statutory provi-
sion, and it can be inferred that it adopts that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute
without changing the wording of that provisions."); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 581, 589 (1984) (stating that unaffected portions of changed tax
law concerning taxation of life insurance companies is to be given same meaning as be-
fore amendment); see also 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 316 (1955) ('Although it may be pre-
sumed that by enacting a statute the legislature intended some change in the existing law,
it is also presumed that the legislature did not intend to overthrow or depart from estab-
lished principles of law, or, beyond what it explicitly declares either expressly or by
necessary implication, to make any alteration in the existing law." (footnotes omitted)).
Where an agency interprets a statute and promulgates regulations reflecting that con-
struction, and the Congress subsequently re-enacts the statute, the Congress implicitly
approves the agency's interpretation. This rule has been referred to by courts as the "can-
on" of "acquiescence-by-reenactment." Ohio v. Department of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432,
458 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (examining CERCLA regulations).
11. See Pacor, Inc. v. H-iggins (In re Pacor), 743 F.2d 984, 987 n.4 (3d Cir. 1984)
(observing in dictum that recent amendment, including renumbering of sections, did not
change the substance of the law at issue); NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STAT-
TES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.33 (1985) ("Provisions of the original act or
section which are repeated in the body of the amendment, either in the same or equiva-
lent words, are considered a continuation of the original law."); cf. United States v. Eller,
208 F.2d 716, 719 (4th Cir. 1953) (noting that no change in substance should be pre-
sumed where regulations were republished "for the sole purpose of rearranging and renur-
bering their sections").
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Based on these rules of statutory construction, this article
draws inferences from earlier versions of section 104(a)(2) to de-
rive its present meaning. Because the language concerning the
treatment of exclusions has not changed from the original enact-
ment in 1918,12 examining earlier versions and interpretations of
the act provides a vital link to the current version of section
104(a)(2).
II. THE CONTROVERSY
The starting point for understanding the controversy surround-
ing personal injury awards is section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code, which contains the basic definition of income. It provides:
"gross income means all income from whatever source de-
rived .... "" The Supreme Court interprets this phrase broadly
to effectuate Congress' intent to tax all gains except those specifi-
cally exempted.' 4 Under the Glenshaw Glass definition, punitive
12. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213Cb)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066
(1919) (providing that damages received "as compensation for personal injuries or sick-
ness . .. whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness" should
be excluded for gross income). While the damages allowed as an exclusion has changed
over the years, the statute's "on account of" language has remained constant. For a dis-
cussion of the evolution of § 104, see MERTENS, supra note 9, § 7.02.
13. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1988). References to sections, unless otherwise indicated, are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
14. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955). In Glenshaw
Glass, the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer realizes income when there are "instances
of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion." Id. at 431. See infra notes 162-72 and accompanying text.
A theoretical debate continues about whether or not amounts received as compen-
satory damages for personal injuries would be income in the absence of a statutory exclu-
sion. The argument for including compensatory damages in income rests upon the premise
that taxpayers lack a basis in "human capital" to offset payments received. See, e.g.,
Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 696 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Since there is no tax
basis in a person's health and other personal interests, money received as compensation
for an injury to those interests might be considered a realized accession to wealth. Never-
theless, Congress has, retained the exclusion (now codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)).-), rev'g
79 T.C. 398 (1982); BORIs I. BnrrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF IN-
COME, ESTATES & GIFTS, 5.6, at 5-41 (2d ed. 1989) (comparing "human capital" theory
to "human depreciation" claimed by some wage earners for loss of physical and mental
capacity, but soundly rejected by courts); Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Dam-
age Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L REV. 43 (1987) (criticizing return of capital
argument).
The argument for excluding such receipts from ihcome is that the damages merely
restore injured parties to the status ante. See, e.g., Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432 n.8
(noting the return for personal injury "roughly correspond[s] to a return of human capital"
and is therefore not taxed); Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962)
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damages must be included in gross income absent a specific exclu-
sion."3 Section 104(a)(2) provides an exclusion for damages, but
does not address punitive damages specifically. It excludes from
gross income "any damages received... on account of personal
injuries or sickness." 6 However, determining the extent to which
(finding damages for invasion of privacy taxable where taxpayer's father, not taxpayer,
suffered harm); see also BITIER & LOKKEN, supra, 13.1.4 (discussing exclusion of
damages from gross income under § 104(a)(2)); Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Developing a Theory
of Damage Recovery Taxation, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 759, 766 (1988) (analogizing
personal damage awards to return of capital); Bruce J. Squillante & Jeffrey L. Patterson,
Planning Strategies that Will Keep Personal Injury Damages Excluded from Income,
TAX'N FOR AcCT., June 1987, at 38 (reviewing meaning of payments received "on ac-
count of" personal injury and when excludable under § 104(a)(2)).
15. See, e.g., Glenshaw GLass, 348 U.S. at 431 (concluding that "mere fact" payment
was to punish wrongdoing does not alter payment's character as income to recipient);
Thompson v. Comm'r, 406 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1969) (punitive damages are taxed
as ordinary income); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (as amended in 1965) ("[P]unitive damages
such as treble damages under the antitrust laws and exemplary damages for fraud are
gross income."). Compare Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 657 (3d Cir. 1990)
(finding award for age discrimination analogous to personal injury award and excludable
from personal income), affg in part and rev'g in part 92 T.C. 510 (1989) with United
States v. Burke, 60 U.S.L.W. 4404 (U.S. May 26, 1992). See infra text accompanying
notes 349-57.
16. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Section 104 provides:
(a) In General - Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and
not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical,
etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include-
(1) amounts received under workmen's compensation acts as
compensation for personal injuries or sickness;
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or
agreement and whether as lump-sums or as periodic payments) on ac-
count of personal injuries or sickness;
(3) amounts received through accident or health insurance for
personal injuries or sickness (other than amounts received by an employ-
ee, to the extent such amounts (A) are attributable to contributions by
the employer which were not includible in the gross income of the
employee, or (B) are paid by the employer);
(4) amounts received as a pension, annuity, or similar allow-
ance for personal injuries or sickness resulting from active service in the
armed forces of. any country or in the Coast and Geodetic Survey or the
Public Health Service, or as a disability annuity payable under the pro-
visions of section 808 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980; and
(5) amounts received by an individual as disability income
attributable to injuries incurred as a direct result of a violent attack
which the Secretary of State determines to be a terrorist attack and
which occurred while such individual was an employee of the United
States engaged in the performance of his official duties outside the Unit-
ed States.
For purposes of paragraph (3), in the case of an individual who is, or has
been, an employee within the meaning of section 401(c)(1) (relating to
19921
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this section encompasses punitive damages is central to the con-
troversy and the thesis of this article.
The Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") currently takes
the position that punitive damages are not excluded from gross
income under section 104(a)(2). 7 The Service limits application
self-employed individuals), contributions made on behalf of such individual
while he was such an employee to a trust described in section 401(a) which is
exempt from the tax under section 501(a), or under a plan described in section
403(a), shall, to the extent allowed as deductions under section 404, be treated
as contributions by the employer which were not includible in the gross income
of the employee. Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in
connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness.
Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970) provides:
Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income the amount of any damages
received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or
sickness. The term "damages received (whether by suit or agreement)" means
an amount received (other than workmen's compensation) through prosecution
of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settle-
ment agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution.
The Service's initial articulation of the requirement of tort or tort-type rights ap-
peared in Sol. Mem. 2042, IV-1 C.B. 26 (1925), revk'd, I.T. 2170, IV-2 C.B. 28 (1925),
in which it distinguished the taxation of damages received for breach of a promise to
marry from damages received for alienation of affections and personal defamation and
from money received for release of child custody rights. The basis for the distinction was
that the former "resulted solely from the surrender of a right to enforce a promise which
the law confers upon either party to a bilateral contract . . . while in the latter, "[t]he
payment involved was attributable to a tort." Id. at 26-27. In United States v. Burke,
Justice Scalia questioned the Service's tort rights formulation as not within the range of
reasonable interpretation of statutory text. 60 U.S.L.W. 4404, 4407 (U.S. May 26, 1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
Income requires an accession to wealth. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431. Whether
or not damages constitute an accession to wealth depends upon the reason for which they
are awarded. Therefore, determining whether damages have been recovered for a tort or
breach of contract is one step in determining whether the award will be included in gross
income.
The law of the jurisdiction applied in the underlying suit determines whether a par-
ticular cause of action is based in tort or in contract. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,
387 U.S. 456 (1967). Once the nature of the claim or interest is determined, federal law
applies to determine the tax consequences. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294,
1297 (1987) (affirming that tax consequences of an award depends on type of claim being
litigated), aft'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988); Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236, 244
(1986) (reviewing exclusions under § 104(a)(2)), affid, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987);
Roemer, 79 T.C. at 405 (1982) (tax consequences depend on "character of claims"), rev'd,
716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983). The issue of whether or not a particular cause of action is
based upon "tort or tort type rights" has spawned a substantial volume of litigation. See
infra note 44. The law of the applicable jurisdiction also determines whether awards are
compensatory or punitive. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 33 (comparing hypothetical
states where one state does not allow punitive damages and another state provides exclu-
sively for punitive damages).
17. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 34 (concluding punitive damages "do not com-
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of this exemption to payments which are analogous to a restoration
of capital."8 Capital, in the Service's view, includes human capi-
tal. Because the Service's position is that "punitive damages are
awarded not 'on account of personal injury,' as required by section
104(a)(2), but are determined with reference to the defendant's
degree of fault," 9 punitive damages restore no capital and the
amount of such an award constitutes gross income. This view
recently received judicial endorsement with the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Commissioner v. Miller,20 and two district courts21
which held that punitive damages did more than make the plaintiff
whole and were, therefore, not excludable from income.'
A contrary position has been advanced by the Tax Court,'
pensate a taxpayer for a loss but add to the taxpayer's wealth"), revk'g Rev. Rul. 75-45,
1975-1 C.B. 47; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-06-013 (Nov. 7, 1990) (denying taxpayer's
request to exclude punitive damages awarded in asbestos litigation from taxpayer's income
because punitive damages "represent an addition to the wealth of the recipient'). See infra
notes 223-65 and accompanying text.
18. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. at 34.
19. Id.; see also Gen. Couns. Mer. 37,398 (Jan. 31, 1978).
20. 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'g 93 T.C. 330 (1989).
In Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398, 408 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir.
1983), nonacq. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55, the Tax Court held that punitive dam-
ages awarded predominantly for injury due to business and professional reputation were
not awarded "on account of personal injuries" and were thus includible in gross income.
In dicta, however, the Tax Court questioned the Service's interpretation of § 104(a)(2) as
excluding punitive damages altogether: "Since his interpretation [in Revenue Ruling 75-45]
arguably comes within the language of section 104(a)(4)[2]. ... the Commissioner has,
chosen to allow punitive damages to be excluded from gross income in the same manner
as compensatory damages provided they arise out of a personal injury." Id. at 408. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit referred to the Service's interpretation of § 104(a)(2) as "liberal"
and excluded the punitive damages Roemer received from income. Roemer, 716 F.2d at
700. See infra notes 268-83 and accompanying text.
21. O'Gilvie v. United States, Civ. A. No. 90-1075-B, 1992 WL 123,806 (D.Kan. May
26, 1992) (punitive damages received in wrongful death action not excludable from in-
come); Kemp v. Comm'r, 771 F. Supp. 357 (N.D.Ga. 1991), appeal dismissed, No. 91-
8610 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 1991) (punitive damages received in settlement of action to vindi-
cate violation of First Amendment rights are not excludable from income).
22. Miller, 914 F.2d at 590. In particular, the court held that, like punitive damages,
the settlement was a "windfall," id at 591 (quoting Cheek v. J.B.G. Properties, 344 A.2d
180, 184 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1975)), and that it was "over and above any award of
compensatory damages" and thus beyond the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. Id. (quoting Exxon
Corp. v. Yarama, 516 A.2d 990, 997 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1986)). See also O'Gilvie,
1992 WL 123,806 at *4; Kemp, 771 F. Supp. at 359 (citing Miller).
23. Miller, 93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the
Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, holding that punitive damages are not excluded
under § 104(a)(2), its decision is binding on the Tax Court only with respect to cases
appealable to the Fourth Circuit. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970),
aff'-4 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), and cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). The Tax
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the Ninth Circuit24 and one district court.2' These authorities as-
sert that punitive damages are encompassed by section 104(a)(2)
and, therefore, should be excluded from gross income. Collectively,
these courts reason that the phrase "any damages" in the language
of the exemption includes both compensatory and punitive damag-
es,26 and that the phrase "on account of" in the statute is equiva-
lent to "'[flor the sake of,' 'by reason of,' or 'because of.'" 27
This construction of the statute broadens section 104(a)(2) to in-
clude punitive damages. According to the Tax Court's reasoning,
because most jurisdictions require that some amount of actual dam-
ages be proven before punitive damages may be awarded, "punitive
damages are received 'on account of' personal injury, although
personal injury alone may not justify an award of punitive
damages."28
In 1989, Congress added a new dimension to this controversy
when it enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989.29 This act amended section 104(a) to provide "[p]aragraph
(2) [of section 104(a)] shall not apply to any punitive damages
[received] in connection with a case not involving physical injury
or physical sickness."" As a result, punitive damages awarded in
Court's opinion in Miller retains its vitality with respect to cases from other circuits, and
its analysis of § 104(a)(2) is typical of arguments excluding punitive damages from gross
income. See infra notes 309-31 and accompanying text.
24. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 700. In Roemer, the Ninth Circuit held punitive damages
excludable on the basis of the Service's "liberal interpretation" of § 104(a)(2). Id. The
court cited Revenue Ruling 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47, which held that punitive damages
were within the scope of § 104(a)(2). Because Revenue Ruling 75-45 has been revoked
by Revenue Ruling 84-108, the continuing vitality of the Ninth Circuit's holding is ques-
tionable. See infra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
25. Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986). However, Burford
may be analyzed more properly as holding that the damages awarded in an Alabama
wrongful death action were compensatory in nature, not punitive. Thus analyzed, Burford
does not address the issue of whether punitive damages are excluded under § 104(a)(2).
See Miller, 914 F.2d at 591 ("[The Burford courtI] . .. 'rejected] the precise argu-
ment .. . that such damages are obtained for punitive rather than compensatory purpos-
es." (quoting Burford, 642 F. Supp. at 637)). For further discussion of Burford, see infra
text accompanying notes 284-96. For discussion of various types of damages, see infra
text accompanying notes 42-84.
26. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697, 700; Burford, 642 F. Supp. at 636; Miller, 93 T.C. at
338.
27. Miller, 93 T.C. at 339 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIo-
NARY (1981)).
28. Id. at 340.
29. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a), 103
Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989) (codified at I.R.C. § 104(a) (West Supp. 1992)).
30. Id. § 7641(a). The provision is effective for punitive damages received after July
[V/ol. 42:339
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cases which do not involve a physical injury or sickness must be
included in income. Alth6ugh the 1989 amendment settled the
debate regarding the status of punitive damages awarded in instanc-
es not involving a physical illness or sickness, it has engendered
considerable discussion and confusion about the extent to which
section 104(a)(2) applies to punitive damages awarded in cases
involving physical sickness or injury." Based on the language of
the amendment, a number of commentators conclude by negative
implication that section 104(a)(2) now excludes punitive damages
awarded in cases involving physical injury. 2 The Service also
adopts, at least unofficially, this interpretation. In two publications,
it advises taxpayers that punitive damages awarded in cases not
involving physical injury or sickness are taxable.33 However, oth-
ers would contend that a conclusion that § 104, as amended in
1989, excludes punitive damages from gross income in a case
involving physical sickness or injury cannot be reached by negative
implication. Exemptions are never granted on inference alone; they
"are not to be implied but must be unambiguously proved."'
The amended exclusion is also susceptible to a plausible alter-
nate interpretation which would make punitive damages awarded in
10, 1989, or in tax years ending after that date, other than amounts received under a
written, binding agreement, court decree or mediation award in effect on or issued before
July 10, 1989, or amounts received pursuant to suits filed on or before July 10, 1989.
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989, § 7641(b)(2), 103 Stat. at 2379. See also H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 622-23 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3225-26 (highlighting the distinction between physical and personal injury
and eliminating the exclusion for damages for the latter). See infra notes 367-95 and
accompanying text,
31. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143 (1992)
(discussing whether tax policies should be used to exclude any component of recovery in
a personal injury suit); David G. Jaeger, The Dispute over Taxation of Employment Dis-
crimination Awards, 69 TAXES 608 (1991) (analyzing tax consequences of employment
discrimination awards).
32. See JAMES D. GHOUDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNmVE DAMAGES LAW AND
PRACTICE § 14.01 at I (Aug. 1990 Cum. Supp.) ("[The 1989 amendment] means that
punitive damages awarded where physical injury or physical sickness are involved are
exempt from taxation, but that all other awards are taxable."); Robert R. Wood & Simon
Noel, Tax Aspects of Settlements, Judgments, Antitrust Payments and Recoveries, 121-5th
Tax Mgmt. (BNA), Portfolio, A-6 (1990) ('Congress settled this issue for punitive dam-
ages received after July 10, 1989.").
33. LR.S., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PuB. No. 525, TAXABLE AND NONTAXABLE IN-
COME 15 (1991); I.R.S., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUB. No. 17, YOUR FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 77 (1990). The official position of the Service is stated in regulations, revenue rul-
ings and revenue procedures. Taxpayers may not rely on publications. See, e.g., Adler v.
Comm'r, 330 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1964).
34. MERTENs, supra note 9, § 5.06; see also Dodge, supra note 31.
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physical injury cases includible in gross income. This alternate
view simply requires that any exemptions from income be explicit
rather than inferred.35 Accordingly, the negative inference that the
exclusion applies to awards where the taxpayer did suffer a physi-
cal injury or sickness would be impermissible. Consistent with this
view, a proper explanation of the amendment limits section
104(a)(2) to its terms so that the section does not speak with re-
spect to punitive damages where physical harm is involved. Any
attempt to expand the exclusion further is inappropriate. In Com-
missioner v. Miller,36 the Fourth Circuit followed this approach,
noting specifically that a fundamental principle of statutory con-
struction demands that exclusions from income be construed nar-
rowly.37 Consequently, the 1989 amendment raises difficult inter-
pretational issues which render the effect of the provision un-
clear.38
The 1989 amendment is also ambiguous with respect to the
particular situation it purported to address explicitly, the taxation of
punitive damage awarded in "a case not involving physical sick-
ness or injury."39 This ambiguity is best illustrated by example.
Assume that a taxpayer is libeled by the defendant, and the taxpay-
er receives a court judgment representing $1,000,000 for actual
damages and $2,000,000 for punitive damages. Since the 1989
amendment, the punitive damages are not excludable from gross
income because the tort did not involve any physical injury or
sickness. Now, assume that as a result of the libel, the taxpayer
suffers an ulcer and damages for this physical manifestation are
alleged in the libel action. The introduction of this illness appears
to bring the taxpayer's punitive damage award within the section
104(a)(2) exclusion. Determining whether or not Congress intended
section 104(a)(2) to encompass this type of fact pattern as an al-
lowed exclusion is difficult and the conclusion reached will no
doubt be subject to considerable dispute.
The legislative history surrounding the passage of the 1989
35. See supra note 16. See O'Gilvie v. United States, Civ. A. No. 90-1075-B, 1992
WL 123,806 (D.Kan. May 26, 1992) (specifically rejecting taxpayer's argument that the
1989 amendment, by implication, meant that prior to the amendment, punitive damages
were excludable).
36. 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'g 93 T.C. 330 (1989).
37. Id. at 590. See also O'Gitvie v. United States, Civ. A. No. 90-1075-B, 1992 WL
123,806 (D.Kan. May 26, 1992).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 367-95.
39. I.R.C. § 104(a).
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amendment provides little guidance for clarifying the law's effect
in situations like the libel hypothetical. The House report regarding
the 1989 amendment indicates only a desire to tax punitive damag-
es received in connection with a non-physical personal injury.' It
does not yield any further direction for interpreting the provision
generally or applying the rule to cases where the underlying tort is
not physical in nature, but physical manifestations support a claim
for punitive damages.
In summary, the current state of the law regarding the taxabil-
ity of punitive damages is confused. Although the 1989 amendment
did resolve one narrow aspect of this debate as noted above, it
unfortunately continues to obscure the subject by raising new,
difficult interpretational issues.4 ' The chaos and turmoil resulting
from the various views expressed above warrants resolution.
I. TYPES OF LEGAL DAMAGES
In order to properly construe section 104(a)(2), it is important
to review the three basic types of legal damages, compensatory,
nominal and punitive. The tax consequences of an award or settle-
ment depend upon determining the rationale for the award and
specifically what, if anything, it replaced.4' Thus, "the question to
be asked is 'in lieu of what were the damages awarded?' 43 To
answer this question, it is necessary to determine the nature of the
claim giving rise to the award of damages.44 If the damages are
40. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 622-23 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018, 3225-26.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 367-95.
42. See supra note 16.
43. Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1944) (citation
omitted) (determining whether amounts received in settlement were lost income or a
non-taxable return of capital), aff'g 1 T.C. 952 (1943), and cert. denie4 323 U.S. 779
(1944); see also Roemer v. Commissioner 79 T.C. 398, 405 (1982), revd, 716 F.2d 693
(9th Cir. 1983); Wolfson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1228, 1230 (6th Cir. 1981)
(determining whether damages were for lost earnings or injury to personal reputation),
aff'g and remanding T.C. Memo 1978-445.
44. See, eg., Burke v. United States, 60 U.S.LW. 4404 (U.S. May 26, 1992) (holding
damages received for Title VII violation were to restore wages and employment position
and not for traditional tort-like personal injury excludable under § 104(a)(2), rev'g 929
F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963) (holding
that legal expenses incurred to defend title to business assets in a divorce proceeding
were personal in nature and therefore not deductible); Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d
434 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (settlement of racial discrimination claim not excluded from gross
income by § 104(a)(2)); Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990) (ADEA
claim is personal in nature); Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330, 334-35 (1989) (defa-
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received as compensation for the personal injury, they are clearly
excluded from gross income by section 104(a)(2). In contrast, when
the damages are awarded for another purpose, such as to punish or
to deter the wrongdoer, application of section 104(a)(2) becomes
questionable.45 It is thus appropriate to examine the nature of
each type of damage, its purpose and the policies which support it
when determining whether or not an award should be excluded
from income.
A. The Compensatory Nature of Tort Damages
The primary function of the law of torts is to compensate an
injured party for harm suffered on account of a legal wrong.46 In
particular, tort law aims to place the injured party in the same
position he would have been in if the wrong never occurred, i.e.,
to make the plaintiff whole.47 The idea of punishment or deter-
rence is the objective of the criminal law.48
An injured party is restored to the state ex ante through an
award of damages. "[T]he damages awarded should be an amount
sufficient to indemnify the plaintiff for the loss which he has suf-
fered at the hands of the defendant."49 "IMhe stress [in a tort
case] is on restoration to the economic position which presumably
would have been occupied if no loss had occurred." '° Consequent-
mation is a personal injury action), rev'd, 914 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1990); Rickel v. Com-
missioner, 92 T.C. 510, 516 (1989) (claim for violation of Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act is an action in nature of personal injury), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 900
F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990); Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236, 244 (1986) (action under
42 U.S.C § 1983 is a claim for violation of personal rights and damages are excluded by
section 104(a)(2)), aft', 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
1294, 1307 (1986) (claim for malicious prosecution is an action for personal injury), aff'd,
848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 118-34.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 901 cmt. a, 902 (1979); W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 1, 5-6 (5th ed. 1984) (stating
that the purpose of. tort law is to adjust losses and compensate for injuries caused by the
conduct of another); 1 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAG-
Es § 30 (9th ed. 1912) (stating that the object of both contract and tort law is to com-
pensate for pecuniary loss).
Tort law awards damages to serve other purposes as well. Among these other pur-
poses are the recognition and affirmation of individual rights, punishment and deterrence.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, § 901; KEETON et al., supra, §§ 2-4. These purposes are
discussed infra text accompanying notes 62-84.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901; SEDGWICK, supra note 46, § 30.
48. KEETON et al., supra note 46, § 2, at 9.
49. SEDGWICK, supra note 46, § 30, at 25.
50. Bertram Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 614, 617 (1952). The ob-
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ly "[u]nless punitive damages are contemplated, the damages in tort
are to be considered compensatory .... .-5 Tort law requires that
the plaintiff prove the value of the sustained injuries. By requiring
the damages to be proved with exactness, or at least a high degree
of certainty, the law insures that the damages remain compensato-
ry, 2 and do not become a windfall to the plaintiff. The amount
of the award thus corresponds to the pecuniary value of the loss
proven by the plaintiff.5 3
The compensatory nature of damages is further evidenced by
an examination of the proof required to support their award. In
order to receive compensatory damages, the plaintiff must prove, in
monetary terms, the value of the sustained injuries.' The use of
such evidence serves a dual purpose. It first insures full compensa-
tion of injuries sustained by the plaintiff. Secondly, it simultaneous-
ly avoids over-compensating the plaintiff and punishing the defen-
dant.5
5
The compensatory function of tort damages is also apparent
from an analysis of the personal interests infringed by a defendant.
An examination of these personal interests reveals two broad types:
pecuniary interests, such as lost wages or damages to property, and
non-pecuniary interests, such as bodily or emotional harm. 56 Inju-
jective of damages in contract is conceptually identical, but contract damages give the
injured, party the benefit of the bargain. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344
(1979).
51. Harnett, supra note 50, at 617 (emphasis added).
52. See generally SEDGWiCK, supra note 46, § 170 (discussing plaintiff's burden of
proof).
53. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 905-06.
54. Certain compensatory damages are recoverable only if the actual or a reasonably
certain value can be ascertained. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REME-
DIES § 3.3 (1973). For example, in pecuniary loss cases involving property damage or
loss of earning capacity, the tortfeasor is liable only for those losses which the injured
person can substantiate within definite standards of certainty. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 906.
55. The universal and cardinal principle is that the person injured shall receive a
compensation commensurate with his loss or injury, and no more . . . ." L G.
SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 12 (4th ed. 1916); see also
SEDOWICK, supra note 46, §§ 29, 38 (damages are to compensate for loss sustained to
degree possible).
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 903, 905-906 (stating that damages may
be awarded for nonpecuniary harm such as bodily harm and emotional distress and for
pecuniary loss including harm to property, earning capacity and creation of liabilities);
SEDGWICK, supra note 46, §§ 39-51 (suggesting that non-pecuniary losses typically include
such things as pain and suffering, loss of consortium, damage to reputation, mental suffer-
ing or emotional distress, loss of freedom, impairment of one's faculties, fear and anger
and even the mental anguish of witnessing a tort being committed upon a third person or
19921
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ry to a pecuniary interest simply requires a determination of the
amount of such damages. For example, if the defendant destroys
property belonging to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to dam-
ages in the amount of the value of that property.57 By contrast, an
injury to a non-pecuniary interest is often less apparent, and as a
result, more difficult, if not impossible, to measure." Nonetheless,
authorities generally are clear that awards for these non-pecuniary
harms are intended to be viewed as compensation.59
Another characteristic of compensatory damages is that they
are assessed according to the losses suffered by the plaintiff with-
out regard for the defendant's motive in causing the loss.' ° As
stated earlier, tort damages focus only on compensating the plain-
tiff by placing the plaintiff in the pre-loss position. Any amount
awarded above the value of the loss suffered based on the
defendant's motive or desire for harming the plaintiff is inconsis-
tent with the nature of compensatory damages. A separate category
of damages, punitive damages, developed later to address concerns
a corpse); SUTHERLAND, supra note 55, § 75 (recognizing that compensatory damages
include both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses).
57. Section 104(a)(2) does not exclude from income gain realized on account of injury
to property.
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §903 cmt. a.
Compensation for an injury should not be denied simply because damages are not
measurable with precision. See SEDGWICK, supra note 46, § 46 ("[The law does not
refuse to take notice of such injury on account of the difficulty of ascertaining its de-
gree." (quoting Ballou v. Famum, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 73, 77 (1865)). The task of mea-
suring nonpecuniary losses 'is necessarily left to the discretion of the jury." SUTHERLAND,
supra note 55, § 75.
59. See, e.g., SEDOWICK, supra note 46, § 38 ("The law does not attempt the impos-
sibility of replacing the plaintiff in exactly the position he was in before the injury, yet
within the bound of possibility its aim is compensation."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 903. While complete certainty is not required when proving the amount of such
non-pecuniary compensatory damages, the amount claimed must bear some relation to the
injury suffered. See generally DOBBS, supra note 54, § 3.3 ('[Courts seem to have
striven for a balance that permits the plaintiff to recover even if his proof is incomplete,
but at the same time imposes upon him the requirement that he prove as much as he
reasonably can and in any event that he prove something relevant to computation of dam-
ages."). If the loss is not proven with the requisite amount of certainty, the court will
refuse to grant compensatory damages and may instead award nominal damages. See id.
§ 3.8, at 191 ("[Nominal] damages are awarded when the plaintiff has asserted substantial
damages, but has been unable to prove those damages with the required certainty."). For
discussion of nominal damages, see infra text accompanying notes 62-71.
60. SUTHERLAND, supra note 55, § 98 ("So far as pecuniary elements of damage and
full compensation for injury are concerned, either in actions of tort or for breach of con-
tract, the right to recover is wholly independent of the motives . . .).
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about the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct." Compensato-
ry damages, however, only address the harm caused to the plaintiff.
B. Nominal Tort Damages
At common law, damages were awarded only for a loss actu-
ally sustained 62 As a corollary to that rule, in the absence of loss
or harm determinable with some degree of accuracy, compensatory
damages cannot be awarded. 3 Later, a category of damages de-
veloped to address the situation where no actual loss occurred, but
a right was infringed upon by the defendant. For example, a land-
owner has a legal right to be protected against trespasses to land
whether or not such an invasion causes an injury. Recognizing the
need to affirm these kinds of individual rights as another aspect of
tort law, courts developed the concept of "nominal" damages.'
Nominal damages result from interference with a legal right where
no loss or specific harm has occurred.6" Consequently, their award
is made irrespective of whether the plaintiff suffered any harm.'
Moreover, since they are not predicated on the harm caused, but
simply upon the violation of a right, they are trivial in amount. 7
61. See infra text accompanying notes 72-84.
62. SEDWICK, supra note 46, § 96a ("Mhe common law, as a general rule, only
gives actual compensation in cases of actual injury.").
63. See, e.g., Gottesman & Co. v. Portland Terminal Co., 27 A.2d 394 (Me. 1942) (re-
manding for a new trial on the issue of damages because no evidence had been intro-
duced to furnish a basis for estimating the damages plaintiff incurred); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (The burden is on the one who seeks recovery of dam-
ages to establish "by proof the extent of the harm and the amount of money representing
adequate compensation with as much certainty as the nature of the tort and the circum-
stances permit."); SEDGWICK, supra note 46, § 96a ('If it appears that though the defen-
dant is in fault, still that the plaintiff is not injured, he can have no relief.").
64. See SEDOWICK, supra note 46, §§ 96-109 ("Wherever the breach of an agreement
or the invasion of a right is established, the English law infers some damage to the
plaintiff. . . ." Id § 97.).
65. See id. §§ 97-98, 101 (stating that damages may be warranted for the infringement
of a right or for wrongdoing even if there is no injury); DOBBS, supra note 54, §§ 3.1,
3.8 (suggesting that nominal damages may be awarded to "vindicate a legal right" or
when plaintiff is unable to prove substantial damages with the "required certainty").
66. See SUTB-RLAND, supra note 55, § 9 (noting that although no actual injury is
sustained, the violation of a legal right is in itself injurious and worthy of a damage
award); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 cmt b (noting that "nominal
damages can be awarded when the defendant has invaded an interest of the plaintiff pro-
tected against nonharnful conduct of the sort committed by the defendant and no harm
has been proved").
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907; SEDoWIcK, supra note 46, §§ 96a, 101-
106. Nominal damages may be awarded whenever a legal right is violated regardless of
whether the action is in tort or contract, or whether it involves a personal or property
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The differences in the nature of nominal damages, as contrast-
ed with compensatory and punitive damages, are also reflected in
the proof required to obtain their award." At trial, the plaintiff is
not required to offer any evidence of the value of the loss suffered
if only nominal damages are sought for an invasion of a right.'
In contrast, the proof for an award of compensatory damages fo-
cuses solely on the monetary value of the harm the defendant
causes the plaintiff without consideration of the defendant's motive
or deliberateness of conduct.7" As such, where the plaintiff can
prove actual harm with certainty, the court will award compensato-
ry damages, and where plaintiff -cannot offer such proof, but a
legal right is infringed upon, the court will award nominal damag-
es.
7 1
C. Punitive Damage Awards
A separate category of damages developed to address the
egregiousness of defendants' conduct. "Punitive damages are dam-
ages other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against
a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct." 2 Punitive
damages are awarded in an effort to reduce the likelihood that the
defendant or others will repeat the conduct in the future.73 They
are provided "to promote the peace and quiet of society, and to
protect every one in the full enjoyment of his rights . . . ."' Ac-
right Generally, the amount of nominal damages is insignificant, such as $1.00. DOBBS,
supra note 54, § 3.8. But see id. § 3.9 (noting that for certain dignitary harms, courts
permit substantial damage awards despite the absence of a pecuniary injury).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 cmt. a; DOBBS, supra note 54, § 3.8
("nominal damages ... [are] not compensable even in a limited sense .... ). Cf.
SEDOWICK, supra note 46, § 352 (discussing the circumstances in which courts permit an
award of exemplary damages).
69. Compare the plaintiff's burden here with the burden of proof necessary for an
award of compensatory damages, discussed supra text accompanying notes 42-61.
70. See sources cited supra note 58.
71. DOBBS, supra note 54, § 3.8.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(a). But see DOBBS, supra note 54, § 3.9
('Some courts have viewed punitive damages as compensatory, in the limited sense that
they may provide damages for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff.") KEETON et al.,
supra note 46, § 2, at 9 (noting cases awarding punitive damages to reimburse plaintiffs'
costs not otherwise recoverable); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70
HARV. L. REV. 517, 520-21 (1957) (noting "certain elements of compensation can be
identified in awards of exemplary damages").
73. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908.
74. SEDOWICK, supra note 46, § 351. Punitive damages are also referred to as "ex-
emplary damages" or "smart money." Id. § 352; KEETON et al., supra note 46, § 2, at 9.
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cordingly, an award of punitive damages requires more than the
mere commission of a tort; for such damages to be imposed, courts
generally require that the wrongdoer's conduct be outrageous and
despicable.'
. Some authorities note that punitive damages and criminal fines
are essentially the same, except that a private person receives a
punitive damage award whereas the state or local government re-
ceives a criminal fine.76 This similarity extends further because
both a criminal fine and a punitive damage award involve some
element of outrageous conduct by the defendant which is unaccept-
able to society.' No other type of civil damage award serves this
objective.'
The nature of the evidence necessary to support a claim for
punitive damages and to calculate their amount further distinguishes
them from compensatory and nominal damages. While compensato-
ry damages require actual or relatively certain proof of the amount
of the plaintiff's loss and nominal damages serve mainly as a
token for the violation of a right, punitive damages are determined
by evaluating such factors as the "character of the defendant's act,
the nature and extent of the harm... and the wealth of the defen-
dant."79 By focusing on these factors, the court insures that the
amount of the punitive damages will, in fact, serve as a punish-
ment, and hence, a deterrent.
The unique nature of punitive damages is also exhibited by
another characteristic element. Punitive damages are generally per-
mitted only where expressly authorized by statute or case law in
the controlling jurisdiction."0 Moreover, they are generally award-
75. See, e.g., KEETON et al., supra note 46, § 2, at 8-11 (stating that punitive damages
serve to punish the defendant and vindicate his conduct); SEDGwICK, supra note 46,
§ 352 (In cases where the defendant "acted recklessly, or wilfully and maliciously, with a
design to oppress and injure the plaintiff, the jury, in fixing the damages, may disregard
the rule of compensation, and beyond that may, as a punishment to the defendant ...
award such additional damages as... they may deem proper." (quoting Voltz v.
Blackmun, 64 N.Y. 440, 444 (1876))).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 908 cmt. a.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. § 908(2). See also KEETON et al., supra note 46, § 2, at 15 (noting that a
consideration of the defendant's wealth permits a determination as to what amount will
adequately punish); cf. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991)
(holding that punitive damages in excess of four times the compensatory damages awarded
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
80. See KEErON et al., supra note 46, § 9 (listing actions which reject punitive dam-
ages in certain situations and noting representative statutes which authorize their award for
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ed only after compensatory or nominal damages."' Consequently,
punitive damages are available only under limited circumstances. 2
Notwithstanding the labels and generally clear distinctions
among the three types of legal damages, some overlap exists
among the policies and objectives of the various types of damages,
particularly with respect to statutory violations.8 3 A review of the
nuances of any particular cause of action and the associated dam-
ages award is beyond the scope of this article. However, character-
ization of damages received in any legal action is a critical step for
federal income tax purposes, because the nature of the award will
determine its taxability. 4 The Service and courts considering tax
consequence that may follow these awards examine the underlying
litigation to determine the nature of an award for tax purposes.
This article proceeds to analyze the proper tax treatment assuming
the nature of a damage award has been determined.
IV. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS PRIOR TO GLENSHAW GLASS
Since the first tax act, the Revenue Act of 1913,85 the appro-
priate tax treatment of damages received on account of personal
injury has been a subject of debate. Under this law, a tax was
imposed upon an individual's "entire net income, 8 6 which was
broadly defined to include "gains or profits and income from any
source whatever .... ""
A. Administrative Practice Prior to the Statutory Exclusion
Interpreting the 1913 Act's definition of income, Treasury
Decision 213588 addressed the tax consequences of accident insur-
particular torts).
81. Id § 2, at 9, 14; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmL C.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 908.
83. See, e.g., Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding
liquidated damages awarded pursuant to Equal Pay Act served both a deterrent and com-
pensatory purpose).
84. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
85. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), reprinted in 93 UNITED STATES REVENUE
ACTS 1909-1950, pt. 4 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed. 1979) [hereinafter U.S. REVENUE
ACTS].
86. Id. § 2(A)(1), 38 Stat. at 166.
87. Id. § 2(B), 38 Stat. at 167.
88. T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39 (1915), repealed in part by T.D. 2442,
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 25, 26 (1917). One early commentator stated that life insurance
proceeds -would probably have to be reckoned as part of the *income* of the beneficiary
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ance policies and tort damages. Using the above definition, the
Treasury held that proceeds of "an accident insurance policy [re-
ceived] on account of accidents sustained is returnable as gross
income by the insured person." 9 By analogizing tort damages to
the receipt of accident insurance proceeds, the Treasury concluded
that such damages would be includible in income.
An amount received as the result of a suit or compromise
for "pain and suffering" is held to be such income as
would be taxable under the provision of law that includes
"gains or profits and income derived from any source
whatever." An amount thus received would be, in its na-
ture, similar to an amount paid to a person insured by an
accident insurance policy on account of an accident sus-
tained.90
A 1917 Treasury Decision extended this rationale to payments
received under various accident compensation laws.9' Treasury
Decision 2570 states, "[p]ayments made to an insured employee by
a corporation under the accident compensation laws of the several
States constitute taxable income of the employee." 92 Similarly, the
first Treasury regulations regarding the tax treatment of damage
awards provided that amounts received as the result of a suit or
compromise for personal injury were income.93 The regulations,
or recipient, if not specifically exempted. But in pursuance of a humane and wise policy,
the income tax laws have generally provided for the exemption of such funds." HENRY C.
BLACK, A TREAISE ON THE LAW OF INCOME TAXATION UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE
LAWS § 87 (2d ed. Supp. 1916).
89. T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 39. This Decision further held "[]he pro-
ceeds of accident insurance policies paid upon the death of the person insured to the
beneficiaries is to be treated like the proceeds of life insurance policies." Id. Because life
insurance proceeds were specifically excluded from income, Revenue Act of 1913 § 2(B),
38 StaL at 167, accident insurance payments would or would not have been includible in
gross income depending upon the condition of the insured after the accident. BLACK,
supra note 88, § 74.
90. T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 42. See also BLACK, supra note 88, § 87
("It may also be remarked that, under [the Revenue Act of 1913,] money received by the
assured himself, as in the case of accident insurance, will not be exempt, since in theory
it merely takes the place of what he would have earned during the period of has disabili-
ty.").
91. T.D. 2570, 19 Treas. Dec. nt. Rev. 321, 323 (1917).
92. Id.; see also BLACK, supra note at 88, at 874 (3rd ed. 1917) ("An amount re-
ceived as the result of a suit or compromise for 'pain and suffering' is held to be such
income as would be taxable under . . . " then existing state and federal tax laws.).
93. Treas. Reg. § 33, art. 4 (1918) (the regulations were promulgated pursuant to the
Revenue Act of 1916, as amended).
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however, recognized that damages which constitute a return of
capital are not included in income.' Consequently, several early
Treasury Decisions, coupled with the regulations, reflect a basic be-
lief that money received in compensation for injury to the human
body or person is not analogous, for tax purposes, to a return of
capital.95
In 1918, the Solicitor of the Internal Revenue Service ("Solici-
tor") reexamined the taxation of accident insurance proceeds re-
ceived on account of personal injury.' This reconsideration was
apparently engendered, in part, by several amendments to the Reve-
nue Act of 1916, which excluded the proceeds of life insurance
policies from gross income,7 as well as the fact that several cases
pending before the Supreme Court advocated a reinterpretation of
"income."
Despite those cases and the 1916 amendments, the Service did
not change its view of the tax status of life insurance proceeds. In-
stead, it opined "that income included 'anything which is of easy
valuation in money which is derived from the use of capital, ...
and that capital includes personal qualities as well as material
things."9" The Solicitor further stated:
the proceeds of an accident insurance policy received by an
individual on account of personal injuries sustained by, him
through accident are clearly income. They are derived from
physical injury to the body of the insured, that is, they are
derived from the use of his capital. Instead of selling his
labor, that is, the services of his body or mind, and receiv-
ing compensation therefor, the insured suffers injury to his
94. Id. § 33, art. 94 (stating that the amount of a payment received as damages "in
excess of amount necessary to make good the damage . .. - is income); see also Treas.
Reg. § 45, art. 49 (1919) (noting that income does not include the amount of involuntary
conversion damages because that amount represents a return of capital when proper re-
placement property is not required).
95. See also BLACK, supra note 88, § 289 (remarking that under the Revenue Act of
1913, accident insurance proceeds "received by the assured himself, as in the case of
accident insurance, will not be exempt, since in theory it merely takes the place of what
he would have earned during the period of his disability.").
96. Letter from the Solicitor of the Internal Revenue to the Secretary of the Treasury
(April 11, 1918), available in National Archives Record Group No. 60, Straight No. File
191500-1 [hereinafter Solicitor's Letter] (rendering an opinion on the includability of acci-
dent insurance policy proceeds).
97. Revenue Act of 1916, § 4. Compare Solicitor's Letter, supra note 96 (noting that
a deduction was not permitted for these proceeds).
98. Solicitor's Letter, supra note 96, at 3.
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body for which he receives compensation. In both cases
money has 'come in." '
In adopting this view, the Solicitor emphasized his conclusion
by noting that the section which exempted life insurance proceeds
from tax "describes such proceeds as 'income.'"'t ° The Solicitor
reasoned that if life insurance proceeds are income unless specifi-
cally excluded, accident insurance proceeds should be treated like-
wise, i.e., as income.01
The Secretary of the Treasury, apparently concerned with the
logic of the Solicitor's conclusion, requested the Attorney General's
opinion on the matter."° The Attorney General deferred respond-
ing to the Secretary's request until the Supreme Court decided the
above mentioned income tax cases."° After the Court issued
opinions in those cases holding that a return of capital is not in-
come," 4 the Service reversed its position. This reversal was also
influenced by the Attorney General's response to the Treasury
Secretary's earlier request for an opinion regarding the tax treat-
ment of accident insurance proceeds. 0 5 Considering the statutory
exclusion for life insurance proceeds and concluding it was inappli-
cable, the Attorney General opined that accident insurance proceeds
were not income within the meaning of "gains or profits and in-
come derived from any source whatever." 0 6 The opinion further
concluded that such proceeds were merely a return of capital.' 7
99. Id.
100. Id. But see 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 304, 307 (1918) (commenting that the section de-
scribing exempt items as income was not significant to the Service's analysis).
101. Solicitor's Letter, supra note 96, at 4.
102. Letter from the Acting Secretary of the 'Treasury to the Attorney General (April
11, 1918), available in the National Archives, Record Group No. 60, Straight No. File
191500-1.
103. Letter from the Attorney General to the Secretary of the Treasury (April 18, 1918),
available in the National Archives, Record Group No. 60, Straight No. File 191500-1.
104. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918) (distinguishing between "mere
conversion" of capital and gain derived from capital); Lynch v. Horby, 247 U.S. 339,
343 (1918) (describing Congress' intent in the Income Tax Act of 1913 to distinguish a
shareholder's undivided capital interest prior to dividend payment from his share of divi-
dend which is income); Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221, 230 (1918) (holding that "[m]ere
advance in value in no sense constitutes the gains, profits, or income specified by the
statute"); Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 338 (1918) (finding dividends from
surplus accumulated prior to tax effective date not subject to income tax under peculiar
facts of the case).
105. 31 Op. Att'y. Gen. at 304.
106. See Revenue Act of 1916, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No.
50, § 2, 40 Stat. 300, 301.
107. See 31 Op. Att'y Gen. at 304-308. The first statutory embodiment of this proposi-
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The fact that a policy insured against an accident rather than
against a death was irrelevant.
In [the Attorney General's] opinion the act does not make
such a distinction [between life insurance and accident
insurance proceeds], because the proceeds of an accident
insurance policy are not 'gains or profits and income' as
these terms are defined by the Supreme Court. Without
affirming that the human body is in a technical sense the
'capital' invested in an accident policy, in a broad, natural
sense the proceeds of the policy do but substitute, so far as
they go, capital which is the source of future periodical
income. They merely take the place of capital in human
ability which was destroyed by the accident. They are
therefore 'capital' as distinguished from 'income'
receipts."~
In Treasury Decision 2747, the Service agreed with and ex-
panded the Attorney General's opinion by excluding from income
"an amount received by an individual as the result of a suit or
compromise for personal injuries sustained by him through acci-
dent . . . ."" This re-interpretation was designed to comport
with section 4 of the Revenue Act of 1917 which specifically ex-
empted from income the "proceeds of life insurance policies paid
to individual beneficiaries upon the death of the insured . . .. o
Thus, the prevailing administrative position prior to the enactment
of a specific statutory exclusion was that damages received as
compensation for physical injuries were not "income," based upon
the theory that such proceeds are a return of capital.
B. The First Statutory Exemption for Damages Received on
Account of Personal Injuries
The Revenue Act of 1918 contained the earliest predecessor to
section 104(a)(2). 1" Section 213 stated:
tion that accident insurance proceeds are not income is found in § 202(a) of the Revenue
Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 255, reprinted in 96 U.S. REVENUE
ACTS, supra note 85. This section provided that "[t]he gain from the sale or other dispo-
sition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the basis.-
Id. Compare I.R.C. §1001(a) (continuing to reflect an implicit assumption that the
amounts received as compensatory damages are equal to the taxpayer's basis).
108. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. at 308.
109. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457, 457 (1918).
110. Revenue Act of 1917, § 4, 40 Stat. at 302.
111. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066, re-
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[E]xcept as otherwise provided... the term 'gross
income'-
(a) Includes... gains or profits and income derived
from any source whatever ... but
(b) Does not include the following items, which shall
be exempt from taxation under' this title:
(6) Amounts received, through accident or health insur-
ance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensa-
tion for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of
any damages received whether by suit or agreement on
account of such injuries or sickness."'
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the 1918 Act includes only
a cursory treatment of section 213. One House report, however,
acknowledged the controversy surrounding accident and health
insurance and indicated Congress' intent to clarify the tax status of
damages for personal injury. It stated:
Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts re-
ceived through accident or health insurance, or under
workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal
injury or sickness, and damages received on account of
such injuries or sickness, are required to be included in
gross income. The proposed bill provides that such amounts
shall not be included in gross income."
3
printed in 94 U.S. REVENUE AcTs, supra note 85. The provision was incorporated un-
changed in the Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 98, § 213(b)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 238, re-
printed in 95 U.S. REVENUE AcTs, supra note 85, and in the Revenue Act of 1924, Pub.
L. No. 176, § 213(b)(6), 43 Stat. 253, 268, reprinted in 96 U.S. REVENUE ACTS, supra
note 85, and in the Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 20, § 213(b)(6), 44 Stat. 9, 24-
25, reprinted in 97 U.S. REVENUE AcTs, supra note 85. Except for the addition of a
heading and the renumbering of § 213(b)(6) as § 22(b)(5), the provision was re-enacted
without revision in the Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 562, § 22(b)(5), 45 Stat. 791,
798, reprinted in 98 U.S. REVENUE ACTS, supra note 85; the Revenue Act of 1932, Pub.
L. No. 154, § 22(b)(5), 47 Stat. 169, 179, reprinted in 99 U.S. REVENUE ACTS, supra
note 85, the Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 216, § 22(b)(5), 48 Stat. 680, 687, re-
printed in 100 U.S. REVENUE AcTs, supra note 85, the Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L.
No. 740, § 22(b)(5), 49 Stat. 1648, 1658, reprinted in 102 U.S. REVENUE AcTs, supra
note 85, and the Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 554, § 22(b)(5), 52 Stat. 447, 458,
reprinted in 103 U.S. REVENUE AcTs, supra note 85. The provision was codified at 26
U.S.C. § 22(b)(5), without revision, in 1939.
112. Revenue Act of 1918, §§ 213 (a), (b)(6), 40 Stat. at 1066.
113. H. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 86, 92, reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B.
92.
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Although section 213(b)(6) resolved some aspects of the con-
troversy, two ambiguities in its language presented new difficulties.
First, the meaning of the word "damages" in the phrase "any dam-
ages" was unclear, and second, the phrase "on account of" is sus-
ceptible to a number of interpretations. Both of these ambiguities
remain in the existing version of section 104(a)(2). Such loose
statutory language is the root of much of the current controversy
about whether section 104(a)(2) excludes punitive damages from
gross income. Consequently, a careful construction of section
213(b)(6) may resolve much of the controversy surrounding section
104(a)(2).
The most likely, as well as most useful, construction of section
213(b)(6) requires a close analysis of its various clauses. Properly
construed, the "as compensation for" clause is intended to modify
only the "amounts received" clause, not the "any damages" clause.
This interpretation is plausible because the "as compensation"
clause follows the "amount received" clause, but not the "any
damages" clause. Consistent with this formulation, the clause "plus
the amount of any damages received ... on account of [personal]
injuries or sickness" stands alone and should be read accordingly.
Before concluding that this latter clause encompasses punitive
damages, "damages" and the phrase "on account of' must be de-
fined.
Various authorities repeat a common error in their attempts to
define the word "damages." The Service and a number of courts
and commentators read the two words "any" and "damages" to-
gether, as a single phrase "any damages," without recognizing the
distinct meaning definition of each word separately would
yield.114 Construed as a single phrase, section 104(a)(2) extends
to both compensatory and punitive damages."1 ' However, such a
reading does not appear to comport with the earlier Congressional
intent as discussed previously.16 Moreover, such an expansive
reading of the statutory exclusion conflicts with the'general rule
that exclusions from income are to be construed narrowly." 7 A
114. See, e.g., Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986) (excluding
damages received in a wrongful death action); Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330
(1989) (holding that the plain meaning of § 104(a)(2) allows for exclusion of punitive
damage in a defamation action), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
115. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note I11.
117. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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sounder rule of statutory interpretation requires the words "any"
and "damages" to be read independently of each other so that
"any" modifies "damages" as the law defined that term at the
exclusion's inception. This alternate rule, though it appears to be
an exercise in splitting hairs, produces a different result.
One principle of statutory construction is that Congress uses
words in their ordinary or popular meaning.' The ordinary
meaning of the word "damages" means "actual damages" or "com-
pensatory damages." n 9  It does not include "punitive
damages." 20 Adhering to this narrower definition, the word be-
comes consistent with the principal purpose of tort law - compen-
sation 121 Furthermore, this construction has two significant ad-
vantages: it is consistent with Congressional intent to exclude dam-
ages to restore the taxpayer to his pre-accident condition," and
it is consonant with the rule requiring narrow statutory interpreta-
tion.1 3 Consequently, "any damages" has an entirely different
meaning under the second proposed construction than that ascribed
to it when considered as a whole.
The phrase "on account of' is also ambiguous. While several
recent court decisions124 and the Service" 5 have agreed that the
phrase connotes causation, disagreement remains over the type of
causation intended, "sufficient causation" or "but for" causa-
tion.1 6 The interpretation that best effectuates Congressional in-
tent and results in the most narrow construction of the exclusion is
the "but for" option. In other words, punitive damages are not
118. See infra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 46. But see infra text accompanying note 336.
120. See supra text accompanying note 51.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53; see also Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6
B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1927) ("Such compensation as general damages adds nothing to the
individual, for the very concept which sanctions it prohibits that it shall include a profit.
It is an attempt to make the plaintiff whole as before the injury."). But see infra text
accompanying notes 309-21.
122. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
123. See Commissioner v. Jacobsen, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949).
124. See infra notes 284-96, 318-24 and accompanying text.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 242-65.
126. Compare Burford v. Commissioner, 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986) ('sufficient
causation") and Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989) ('sufficient causation"), rev'd,
914 F.2d 886 (4th Cit. 1990); with Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 590 (4th Cir.
1990) ('but for" causation), rev'g Miller v. Commissioner 93 T.C. 330. For a discussion
of Burford, see infra text accompanying notes 284-96. The Tax Court's opinion in Miller
is discussed infra text accompanying notes 309-31, and the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
that case is considered infra text accompanying notes 332-48.
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awarded "on account of" the plaintiff's injuries. Rather, punitive
damages are awarded "on account of' the defendant's egregious
conduct. "But for" the defendant's outrageous behavior, the plain-
tiff could not receive such damages. Resolution of the ambiguity in
this manner also harmonizes the phrase "on account of" with the
construction of "damages" as meaning compensatory damages.
An alternate construction of section 213(b)(6) which reaches
the same conclusion about the exclusion's effect requires dividing
the section into its components to aid in resolving inherent
ambiguities.127  As a whole, section 213(b)(6) contained two
clauses that described the source of the excluded receipt. The first
clause was "[a]mounts received through accident or health insur-
ance or under workmen's compensation acts," and the second
clause was "plus the amounts of any damages received whether by
suit or agreement on account of [personal] injuries or sick-
ness."128 However, a third clause, "as compensation for personal
injuries or sickness," identified the type of receipt to be excluded.
When the clause that identified the type of receipt is read to modi-
fy each clause identifying a source of receipt, both the amounts
received from insurance or pursuant to compensation acts and any
damages from suits or agreements must be received "as compensa-
tion" for injuries to be excluded from gross income. Accordingly,
the phrase "on account of" should be interpreted to mean "as com-
pensation for."
This construction of section 213(b)(6) is consistent with the
Service's position prior to the statute's enactment'29 and with the
then-emerging (as well as the current) judicial view that amounts
127. The author undertakes this exercise cognizant of Justice Frankfurter's admonition in
Reed v. Pennsylvania R.R.:
I part company with the Court not in its reading of English but in its assump-
tion that ... (statutory] construction ... is merely a matter of reading Eng-
fish . . . . [A statute] is an organism, projected into the future out of its past.
It is not merely a collection of words for abstract annotation out of the dictio-
nary. The process of judicial construction must be mindful of the history of the
legislation, of the purpose which infused it, of the difficulties which were en-
countered in effectuating this purpose, of the aims of those most active in re-
lieving these difficulties.
351 U.S. 502, 510 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
128. Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. at 1066.
129. One commentator has stated that the provision "indicates an unqualified con-
gressional acceptance of the prevailing administrative view." Jacques T. Schlenger, Disabil-
ity Benefits Under Section 22(b)(5), 40 VA. L. REV. 549, 551 (1954). Schienger cites the
House report quoted supra text accompanying note 113.
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received as compensation for personal injuries are not "in-
come.""3 It also is in harmony with the apparent Congressional
desire to exclude from income amounts that restore or compensate.
the taxpayer for injury."' In addition, this construction serves to
define the phrase "any damages" as compensatory damages only.
Finally, it comports with the well-known and long established rule
that exclusions are to be narrowly construed. 32
Subsequently in 1954, the single statutory exclusion contained
in section 213(b)(6) was transformed into two subsections.'33 The
first part of section 213 relating to amounts received under
workman's compensation acts was incorporated into section
130. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955)
("The long history of departmental rulings holding personal injury recoveries nontaxable
on the theory that they roughly correspond to a return of capital cannot support exemp-
tion of punitive damages following injury to property. Damages for personal injury are by
definition compensatory only." (citations omitted))
131. Further evidence of Congressional intent can be gleaned from subsequent amend-
ments to the Code. The Revenue Act of 1928 re-enacted § 213(b)(6) verbatim, renum-
bered it as section 22(b)(5), and added the following heading: "(5) Compensation for
Injuries or Sickness." Revenue Act of 1928, § 22(b)(5), 45 Stat. at 798. "Titles ... are
sometimes considered in construing a statute." MERTENS, supra note 9, at 3-54 (citations
omitted). See also Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 590 (4th Cir. 1990) ("It also is
worth noting that § 104 is entitled 'Compensation for injuries or sickness.'"). But see
I.R.C. § 7806(b) (titles are for reference only).
In 1942, Congress amended I.R.C. § 22(b)(5) to disallow exclusion from gross in-
come of amounts received in compensation for medical expenses previously deducted.
Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 753, § 127(d), 22(b)(5), 56 Stat. 798 (1942), reprinted
in 108 U.S. REVENUE ACTS, supra note 85. The Senate Finance Committee Report stated
that: "[S]ection 22(b)(5) is amended to include in gross income amounts received for
compensation for personal injuries or sickness which are attributable to and not in excess
of deductions [for medical expenses allowed] ... in any prior taxable year." (emphasis
added). S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1942). A Senate Finance Committee
Report accompanying a 1982 amendment to § 104(a) stated that § 104, as presently en-
acted, "excludes from gross income the following types of compensation payments for
personal injuries ... (2) damages received under a suit or settlement of a claim." S.
Rep. No. 646, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4580, 4582
(emphasis added). See also Mary J. Morrison, Getting a Rule Right and Writing a Wrong
Rule: The IRS Demands a Return on All Punitive Damages, 17 CONN. L. REV. 39, 59
(1984) (asserting that, in contrast to punitive damages which have always been taxable,
there is a "clear congressional intent to exempt compensatory awards for personal injury").
132. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949) ("The exemp-
tions... should be construed with restraint in the light of the same policy [as that sup-
porting comprehensive taxation]."); Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 590 (1990)
("[I]t is a well-recognized, even venerable principle that exclusions to income are to be
construed narrowly."), rev'g 93 T.C. 330 (1989); cases cited in MERTENS, supra note 9,
at 3-59.
133. In the 1954 recodification of the Internal Revenue Code, § 104(a) took its present
form. I.R.C. of 1954, ch. 736, § 104(a), 68A Stat. 30 (1954) (current version codified at
I.R.C. § 104(a)).
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104(a)(1). The second part, dealing with the receipt of damages on
account of personal injuries, was recodified as section 104(a)(2).
This re-enactment of the exemption appears to be the source of
confusion among various courts and the relevant administrative
agencies about the effect of the provision.
Courts construing section 104(a)(2) generally fail to examine its
predecessor, section 213(b)(6). The division of section 213(b)(6)
into sections 104(a)(1) and (2) effectively eliminated the preceding
analysis as an explanation of the exclusion's applicability to com-
pensatory payments only. Instead of preserving the earlier treat-
ment, the recodification, in effect, severed prior understandings of
the exclusion from identical language albeit in a different format.
This may explain, at least in part, the incorrect conclusions reached
by a few courts. "
C. Early Service Interpretations of the Section
213(b)(6) Exclusion
The Service struggled for a time with whether or not the con-
cept of human capital.35 is implicated by the exclusion of person-
al injury damages."3 The Service was also unclear about whether
damages for personal injuries were "gross income" within the
meaning of the then-evolving definition.1 37 However, the Service
134. "No provision of a statute stands alone, but each must be read with the others
bearing upon it . . . . When a provision of a statute is ambiguous or doubtful' . . . other
sections of the same act which are somewhat analogous in principle' are *entitled to great
weight." MERTENS, supra note 9, § 3.13.
135., See 31 Op. Atty Gen. 304 (1918); see also supra notes 88-90 and accompanying
text.
136. The Service has, since the first Revenue Act, distinguished between physical and
nonphysical injuries. Compare, e.g., T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918)
(damages for personal injury from accident not income) with S. 957, 1 C.B. 65 (1919)
(libel damages are income), modified, Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (1922), decl'd obs., Rev.
Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307.
As recently as 1978, the Service considered whether section 104(a)(2) was limited to
physical injuries. Although it found some support for such a limitation, the Service reject-
ed its adoption. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,398 (Jan. 31, 1978); see also U.S. v. Kaiser, 363
U.S. 299, 317-25 (1960) (listing in an appendix IRS rulings on nontaxable recoveries).
For an article considering the definition of the term "personal injury," see Jennifer S.
Brooks, Developing a Theory of Damage Recovery Taxation, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
759 (1988). See also J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-
Related Personal Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MONT. L. REv. 13 (1989).
Congress revived the physical/nonphysical injury distinction in the 1989 Amendment. See
infra notes 360-382 and accompanying text.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 96-110.
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was certain in its interpretation of the statutory exclusion as ex-
tending only to compensatory damages, i.e., to those awards restor-
ing the taxpayer to the pre-injury position.
In two rulings issued shortly after the enactment of section
213(b)(6), the Service expressed its opinion that the 1918 legis-
lation was merely declarative of the Service's prior position."' In
Solicitor's Memorandum 1384, the Service considered whether
alienation of affections, a nonphysical injury, fell within the new
statutory exclusion. 39 It held that recoveries for nonphysical per-
sonal injuries were not within the exclusion. After recounting de-
cisions analogizing physical injury to lost capital, the Memorandum
concluded:
Probably the provision of the Revenue Act of 1918 in
question, so far as personal injuries are concerned, is mere-
ly declarative of the conclusions thus stated and intended to
go no further. These conclusions rest, as stated, upon the
theory of conversion of capital assets. It would follow that
personal injury not resulting in the destruction or diminu-
tion in the value of a capital asset would not be within the
exemption. 140
The Memorandum's importance stems from its indication that the
Service adopted the view that the statute was simply a codification
of the human capital conversion theory, and as such, excluded only
damages received for "destruction or diminution... of a capital
138. Sol. Mem. 1384, 1 C.B. 71, 71-72 (1920), repealed by Sol. Op. 132, I-I C.B. 92,
93 (1922), sups'd, Rev. Rule. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33.
"Considerable weight is given to the Treasury Department's administrative construc-
tion of tax provisions and to Regulations. One reason is that "[tihe irst administrative
interpretation of a provision as it appears in a new act often expresses the general under-
standing of those who played an important part when the statute was drafted.- MERTENS,
supra note 9, § 3.46, at 76 & n.18 (quoting Augustus v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 38, 43
(6th Cir.), cert denied, 313 U.S. 545 (1941)). See also id. § 3.50, at 81 (regarding the
importance of administrative interpretations contemporaneous with a statute); Harnett, supra
note 50.
139. Sol. Mem. 1384, 1 C.B. 71 (1920), repealed, Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92, 93
(1922).
140. Id., 1 C.B. at 72. The Solicitor's Memorandum held that "affections" did not con-
stitute capital and, thus, the damages received were income. Although the Service's ratio-
nale was affirmed, its finding that an individual's nonphysical attributes are not human
capital was rejected in Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1024, 1023 (1927). See infra
text accompanying notes 159-61; see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,398 (Jan. 31, 1978)
("The [1918] House report ... seems to suggest that the provision was merely declara-
tive of existing law."); Harnett, supra note 50, at 624 ("The interpretative authority has
been relatively sparse, since the statute is generally accepted as clear.").
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asset."'14 1
Two years later, Solicitor's Memorandum 1384 was revoked by
Solicitor's Opinion 132.142 This Opinion held that damages re-
ceived for alienation of affections, slander and money received for
surrender of child custody rights were not income.143 Although
the Opinion specifically approved Memorandum 1384's interpreta-
tion of section 213(b)(6) as inapplicable to damages for nonphysi-
cal injuries, the Opinion found a more "fundamental" principle
controlling. "Mhe question is really more fundamental, namely,
whether such damages [for alienation of affection] are within the
legal definition of income." "
After noting the Supreme Court's definition of income as "the
gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, "14s
the Opinion continued:
In the light of these decisions of the Supreme Court it
must be held that there is no gain, and therefore no in-
come, derived from the receipt of damages for alienation of
affections or defamation of personal character. In either
case the right invaded is a personal right and is in no way
transferable .... If an individual is possessed of a person-
al right that is not assignable and not susceptible of any
appraisal in relation to market values, and thereafter re-
ceives either damages or payment in compromise for an
invasion of that right, it can not be held that he thereby
derives any gain or profit. It is clear, therefore, that the
Government can not tax him on any portion of the sum
received. This also applies to money received in consider-
ation of the surrender of the custody of a minor child.
Holding otherwise would be equivalent to treating as chat-
tels the wife whose affections were alienated and the child
whose custody was surrendered.
... Before the enactment of the Revenue Act of
1918, which specifically exempted from gross income dam-
ages for personal injuries, it was held that damages for
personal injuries due to accident do not constitute income.
141. Sol. Mem. 1384, 1 C.B. at 72.
142. Sol. Op. 132, I-i C.B. 92, 94 (1922).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 93.
145. Id. (quoting Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) and Stratton's Inde-
pendence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)).
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T.D. 2747 .... Much less should damages for alienation
of affections or defamation of personal character be held to
constitute income. t"
Thus, the Opinion's underlying rationale was that damages received
for an invasion of a personal nature are compensatory. 47 The
Service continued to express this view that damages received for
violations of personal rights did not constitute income. However,
no reference was made to the statutory exclusion.
14 1
D. Early Judicial Opinions Addressing the Taxation of Personal
Injury Damages
Early judicial opinions, such as Hawkins v. Commissioner,"
consistently held that compensatory damages for a personal, non-
physical injury are a return of capital and thus do not constitute
income. In Hawkins, the court held that damages received for libel
and slander were not income.' 50 The court reasoned:
146. Id. at 93-94. Solicitor's Opinion 132 modified Solicitor's Opinion 957, 1 C.B. 65
(1919), which held, without elaboration, that damages for libel were includible in income.
Solicitor's Opinion 957 did not distinguish between libel of a personal nature and libel to
a business. Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), criticized Solicitor's
Opinion 132 insofar as it held that money received for release of custody rights is not
income. The taxpayers in Ehrlich argued that a movie contract constituted payment for
their impending loss of privacy. Id. at 808. According to the Ehrlich court, Solicitor's
Opinion 132 offered the only authority that a payment for giving up a legal right would
be excludable from income. Id. The problem with Solicitor's Opinion 132, however, was
that it -permits no distinction between damages for wrongs committed and payments for
giving up any legal right." Id. The court concluded that alienation of affection constitutes
injury to a personal right which can be compensated, but the release of custody rights for
a future period is a "simple contract." Id. Furthermore, the court found that even if the
taxpayers had received payment for giving up their right of privacy and such payment
were not income, allocation of the contract price between this and other taxable elements
was impossible. Id. at 809.
147. The Solicitor's Opinion clearly adopted the rationale of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 903. Comment a explains that "damages for pain and humiliation are
compensatory in that they give to the injured person some pecuniary return for what he
has suffered or is likely to suffer."
148. See I.T. 2422, VIU-2 C.B. 186 (1928) (revoking prior rulings which held damages
for breach of a promise to marry are taxable income), rev'g O.D. 501, 2 C.B. 70 (1920)
and I.T. 2170, IV-1 C.B. 28 (1925); I.T. 2420, VII-2 C.B. 123 (1928) (excluding a
wrongful death award from income); I.T. 1852, U-2 C.B. 66 (1923) (concluding damages
received for the annulment of a marriage on account of fraud and deceit are not income);
I.T. 1804, 11-2 C.B. 61, 62 (1923) (citing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) and
holding that damages for breach of a promise to marry are not taxable income because
such a right is personal and not susceptible of any appraisal).
149. 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927).
150. Id. at 1024. Following Hawkins, McDonald v. Commissioner held that damages
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[T]he amount which petitioner received was wholly by way
of general damages for the personal injury suffered by
reason of the defamatory statements made. It was compen-
sation for injury to his personal reputation for integrity and
fair dealing, including, as the record indicates, the injury to
his health. This is the ordinary basis for compensatory
damages. No suggestion is made that there was special
damage paid or that any was asserted or that punitive or
exemplary damages were claimed or paid, and we need not
consider the law as to them .... Such compensation as
general damages adds nothing to the individual, for the
very concept which sanctions it prohibits that it shall in-
clude a profit. It is an attempt to make the plaintiff whole
as before the injury."'
Hawkins is important in at least two other respects. First, the
court rejected the taxpayer's attempt to restrict the definition of
income so that the definition would prevent damages for personal
injury from being included and thus render use of the exclusion
unnecessary.'52 Recognizing that the statutory definition of in-
come was intended to be the fullest exercise of constitutional pow-
er, the Board of Tax Appeals dismissed this argument.153 Thus,
the rationale and result of the Hawkins decision, i.e., that an award
which restores capital is not income, is entirely consistent with the
Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Glenshaw Glass.154 In
received for breach of promise to marry were not income. 9 B.T.A. 1340 (1928), acq.
VII-2 C.B. 26 (1928).
151. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1024-25 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Accord Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955) (concluding "damages for
personal injury are by deftition compensatory only"); see also supra note 46 and accom-
panying text.
152. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1024. This restrictive definition of income is generally at-
tributed to Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1920), despite similar language in
earlier cases. See, e.g., Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179, 184-85 (1918) (reasoning
that increases in assets arising from corporate activity, such as sales, constitutes income);
Stratton's Indep. Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913) (gains derived from mining
operation constitute income as mining requires a combination of capital and labor). This
definition was later repudiated by Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 430
(1955).
153. Id. (citing Eisner, 252 U.S. at 203).
154. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. Hawkins also cites United States v.
Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189 (1924), mandate granted 44 S.Ct. 634
(1924), for support. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1025. Supplee-Biddle Hardware held that life
insurance proceeds received by a corporation on the death of an officer were not income
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this respect, the decision provided, in part, a foundation for consis-
tent treatment of the exemption in nonphysical injury cases.
Second, the Hawkins court emphasized that the plaintiff did not
claim, and the trial court did not award, special, punitive, or exem-
plary damages.15 Although the court declined to consider the
taxation of these damages, its distinction of such awards from
compensatory damages strongly implies that they are fundamentally
different from compensatory damages, and thus constitute in-
come.
15
Riddle v. Commissioner157 was the first and only case to ad-
dress specifically section 22(a)(5)"58 as it applied to damages re-
ceived in a personal injury suit. However, it did so only in dictum.
The Riddle court held that interest received on an award of
$15,000 for personal injuries resulting from the sinking of the
Lusitania was income."5 9 The court subsequently stated "[t]here is
no controversy as to the award of $15,000, in view of Section
22(a)(5) of the Revenue Act of 1928, which excludes from gross
income damages received on account of sickness or injuries.""6
because the payment was not periodic. 265 U.S. at 195 (Taft, CJ., dictum). An early
concept of income required that its receipt be recurring. Glenshaw Glass rejected this
concept. Nevertheless, the first portion of the Hawkins opinion, makes clear that the dam-
ages were not income even under a broad interpretation of that term. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A.
at 1024. Given this conclusion, the reference to Supplee-Biddle Hardware is inapposite
and logically inconsistent with the court's preceding analysis. Hawkins does not rest on
the rationale that the damages are not income because they are not recurring, but rather
on the basis that there is simply no accession to wealth. But see Sol. Op. 132, I-I C.B.
92 (1922); Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18.
155. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1024 ("No suggestion is made that there was special dam-
ages paid or that any was asserted or that punitive or exemplary damages were claimed
or paid, and we need not consider the law as to them.").
156. See, e.g., SUTHERLAND, supra note 55, § 12, at 46; KEETON et al., supra note 46,
§ 2, at 14 (citation omitted).
157. 27 B.T.A. 1339 (1933) (holding that interest received as a result of an award of
damages for personal injuries was improperly included in income). For further discussion
of Riddle in connection with the distinction between taxation of the damages awarded on
account of personal injury and interest on such awards, see infra text accompanying notes
191-98.
158. The Income Tax Act of 1928, § 22(b)(5) was originally enacted as § 213(b)(6) of
the Income Tax Act of 1918. Section 22(b)(5) provided that "amounts received, through
accident or health insurance or under workman's compensation acts, as compensation for
personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damage received whether by suit or
agreement on amount of said injuries [are excluded from gross income]."
159. Riddle, 27 B.T.A. at 1340.
160. AL at 1339. The Riddle case "has been construed as holding that any compensation
for personal injury would be excludable under § 22(b)(5)." Schlenger, supra note 129, at
551 n.9.
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Thus, the Riddle holding illustrates that only those amounts award-
ed as compensation for the injury are excluded from income. The
amounts received for other purposes, such as for the use or for-
bearance of money 6" or for punishment or deterrence, are
includible in income.
V. COMMISSIONER v. GLENSHAW GLASS Co.
In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,162 the Supreme
Court held that the punitive damages received as a portion of an
antitrust damages award were gross income. In this case, the tax-
payer contended that "punitive damages, characterized as
'windfalls' flowing from the culpable conduct of third parties, are
not within the scope . . . [of the definition of gross income]." 63
The Court, however, rejected the taxpayer's argument, noting that
"Congress applied no limitations as to the source of taxable re-
ceipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature. And the Court has
given a liberal construction to this broad phraseology in recognition
of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those specifi-
cally exempted."' 64 Accordingly, Glenshaw Glass overruled the
Eisner v. Macomber"e5 definition of income. In fact, the Court
specifically stated that the definition in Eisner "was not meant to
provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions." " The
Court concluded:
Here we have instances of undeniable accessions to wealth,
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have com-
plete dominion. The mere fact that the payments were
161. See infra text accompanying notes 180-222 and accompanying text (discussing, in
detail, the tax consequences of interest awarded in personal injury actions).
162. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). Glenshaw Glass reversed a line of cases holding that puni-
tive damages were not income.
163. Id. at 429. Although not specifically set forth in the opinion, the taxpayer appar-
ently argued that the definition of gross income was limited to recurrent receipts, such as
those derived from capital or labor, and as such, a windfall was not income. See, e.g.,
Central Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1935) (holding that where recov-
ery is derived from neither labor nor capital, it is not income); Carl C. Plehn, The Con-
cept of Income as Recurrent, Consumable Receipts, 14 AM. ECON. REv. 1 (1924); Wil-
liam J. Schultz & C. Lowell Hurtis, American Public Finance, in TAXATION OF INCOME
236-38 (8th ed. 1965) (discussing a number of definitions of income including the recur-
rent receipt concept).
164. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 429-430 (citations omitted).
165. 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (defining income as the gain from capital or labor).
166. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.
[VCol. 42:339
TAXATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
extracted from the wrongdoers as punishment for unlawful
conduct cannot detract from their character as taxable in-
come to the recipients. 7
Later in the opinion, the Court specifically distinguished puni-
tive damages from personal injury recoveries. In a footnote, the
Court wrote:
The long history of departmental rulings holding personal
injury recoveries nontaxable on the theory that they roughly
correspond to a return of capital cannot support exemption
of punitive damages following injury to property. Damages
for personal injury are by definition compensatory only.
Punitive damages, on the other hand, cannot be considered
a restoration of capital for taxation purposes."'
This case demarcates the Supreme Court's unequivocal adoption of
the view that gross income does not encompass compensatory dam-
ages. Given this, receipts which cannot be analogized to a return of
human capital are net income." It also illustrates that punitive
damages are not a restoration of capital, but rather a windfall to
the taxpayer.'7 As such, punitive damages are not encompassed
by the statutory exclusion. Moreover, footnote eight in Glenshaw
Glass reinforces the conclusion that the "ordinary everyday sense"
of the word "damages" means compensatory damages;' the term
does not include punitive damages.
72
167. Id.
168. Id. at 432 n.8 (citations omitted). Professors Bittker and Lokken express ambiva-
lence about the importance of the Supreme Court's reference to the Service's rulings.
BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 14, 1 5.6, at 5-41. At one point, they state "[t]his obser-
vation was probably intended only to distinguish the rulings, not to endorse them." Id.
Later, however, they write, "[e]ven if the Supreme Court's reference in Genshaw Glass to
'the long history of departmental rulings holding personal injury recoveries nontaxable*
was not intended to endorse their validity ab initio, it suggests the possibility that they
were subsequently sanctified by congressional acquiescence." Id. at 5.6, at 5-42.
169. Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1928); see supra text accompanying
notes 149-61. Notwithstanding Glenshaw Glass's expansive definition of income, certain
receipts are not gross income. For example, payments in release of marital obligations or
in fulfillment of child support obligations do not constitute income. Gould v. Gould, 245
U.S. 151 (1917). Congress, however, reversed this decision in 1942 when it enacted the
predecessor of § 71(a). Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 753, § 120(a), 56 Stat. 798
(1942), reprinted in 108 U.S. REVENUE Acrs, supra note 85.
170. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432 n.8.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 46-61.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 72-84.
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VI. CASES AND SERVICE RULINGS INTERPRETING PERSONAL
INJURY DAMAGES IN THE TWO DECADES SUBSEQUENT TO
GLENSHAW GLASS
Cases and Service rulings in the two decades following
Glenshaw Glass continued to espouse the view that payments re-
ceived on account of personal injury are compensatory in nature,
and so, are not income.'" Payments for other purposes remained
includible in income."
A. Payments for Consensual Violations of Personal Rights
A series of cases involving consensual violations of personal
rights supports the view that section 104(a)(2) encompasses only
payments which compensate for actual personal injury and, thus,
restore a loss of capital.1" These cases consider the taxation of
173. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990) (remanding to
determine what portion of the award was compensatory and what portion was punitive).
Without citing § 104(a)(2), the following rulings hold that the amounts received by
taxpayers were not income: Rev. Rul. 69-212, 1969-1 C.B. 34 (widow's pension under
Austrian social insurance law); Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14 (payments made by
Austria as war reparations); Rev. Rul. 56-518, 1956-2 C.B. 25, clarified, Rev. Rul.
57-505, 1957-2 C.B. 50, amplf'd, Rev. Rul. 58-500, 1958-2 C.B. 21 (concluding that
compensation paid by Germany to United States citizens on account of persecution which
resulted in damage to life, body, health, liberty or professional or economic advancement
are essentially reimbursement for the deprivation of civil or personal rights and so do not
constitute taxable income); Rev. Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20 (payments to former Korean
War prisoners); Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213 (holding payments to a prisoner of
war pursuant to the War Claims Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. § 2004 (1948), are "in the na-
ture of reimbursement for the loss of personal rights and are not includible in gross in-
come of such individual . . . "). See also Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834,
§ 27(a), 76 Stat. 960, 1067 (1962) (providing that awards by Attorney General to persons
of Japanese ancestry removed from their homes during World War II excludable from
income); cf. Arnold v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) ("Where a
governmental body makes a payment to a taxpayer, the Commissioner tends to exclude it
from income, even though similar payments from a private source would be taxable.")
174. See infra text accompanying notes 223-65.
175. See Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 577 (9th Cir. 1962) (concluding that
payments for future invasion of right of privacy are not exempt from income), aff'g 35
T.C. 646 (1961); Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (holding that mon-
ey received for the release of movie rights was ordinary income comprised of compensa-
tion for rights to privacy, personal service rendered and release of future claims); Meyer
v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Tenn. 1959) (citing Ehrlich as applicable law);
Roosevelt v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 77, 88 (1964) (holding payment for anticipated future
invasion of privacy which did not occur not excludable from income); Miller v. Commis-
sioner, 35 T.C. 631, 645-46 (1961) (stating in dicta that monies obtained in exchange for
the release of motion picture rights amount to a surrender of a contractual right and are
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amounts received for the right to portray the taxpayer, or an ances-
tor or spouse of the taxpayer, on the stage or in film. In each case,
the taxpayers contended that the amounts received were for the in-
vasion of a personal right of privacy, and as such, were in the
nature of advance waivers of possible future damages for personal
injuries. Accordingly, the taxpayers reasoned that the amounts
would be excludable from income by virtue of section 104(a)(2) or
its predecessor. In each decision, however, the court held that
section 104(a)(2) did not exclude from gross income payments
made "for an advance waiver of possible future damages for per-
sonal injury ... .176
The importance of this line of cases is two-fold. Because the
first of these decisions was issued prior to Glenshaw Glass and the
last one some nine years after that Supreme Court opinion, the
consensual violation cases provided a consistent series of interpreta-
tions of section 104(a)(2) throughout this period. This consistency
is particularly noteworthy given the redefinition of income between
Eisner v. Macomber and Glenshaw Glass.
In addition, the reasoning of the opinions lends support to the
conclusion that section 104(a)(2) extends only to compensatory
damages. Collectively, these cases illustrate that a taxpayer must
sustain an actual injury for a payment to be excluded from in-
come."7 The premise underliing this outcome appears to be the
reimbursement of capital loss concept."7  The rationale of these
cases supports the view that section 104(a)(2) does not encompass
punitive damages.'79
ordinary income), aff'd on other grounds, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir.), and cert. denied 370
U.S. 923 (1962).
176. Roosevelt, 43 T.C. at 87. Accord Starrels, 304 F.2d at 576; Meyer, 173 F. Supp.
at 924-25; Ehrlich, 52 F. Supp. at 808-09; Miller, 35 T.C. at 641.
177. See, e.g., Meyer, 173 F. Supp. at 924-25 (noting that § 22 (now § 104(a)(2))
applies only where physical injuries are actually suffered).
178. See, e.g., Starrels, 304 F.2d at 576 (concluding that "receipts which do not com-
pensate [a] taxpayer for a loss but instead add to his wealth" are income); Ehrlich, 52 F.
Supp. at 808 (noting that a covenant not to sue held no value for tax purposes because it
was not a return of capital).
179. See Starrels, 304 F.2d at 577. According to the Starrels court,
"[p]untive damages, on the other hand, cannot be considered a restoration of
capital for taxation purposes." By a parity of reasoning, the exemption in favor
of damages for personal injuries codified in section 104(a)(2) cannot support the
exemption of payments made for injuries which have never occurred because
such payments are not compensatory and hence cannot be considered a restora-
tion of capital.
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B. Taxation of Interest Awarded in Personal Injury Actions
A line of cases involving the taxation of interest' awarded
in personal injury actions, whether prejudgment interest"' or
post-judgment interest" further supports the conclusion that pu-
nitive damages are not excluded from gross, income by section
104(a)(2)."8 3 The support offered by these cases for including pu-
nitive damages in income stems from the nature of an award of
interest. Punitive damages are analogous to interest payments be-
cause a wrongdoer is obligated to pay neither interest nor punitive
damages in the absence of a personal injury. To the extent interest
is taxed as a separate component of a judgment, punitive damages
should be treated similarly.
The Service treats the payment of interest as includible in
income to the recipient.'t As a general rule, amounts received in
satisfaction of a judgment are taxed in the same manner as if those
180. Interest is generally defined as "the sum paid or payable for the use or detention
of money.- DOBBS, supra note 54, § 3.5, at 164. See also Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S.
488, 498 (1940); Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 558 (1932); Rev. Rul.
69-188, 1969-1 C.B. 54.
181. Prejudgment interest is interest awarded on a claim from the time that the injury
occurs until the date of judgment. See, e.g., Monessen S.W. Ry. v. Morgan, 468 U.S.
330, 335 (1988) ("Prejudgment interest is normally designed to make the plaintiff whole
and is part of the actual damages sought to be recovered.-). However, prejudgment inter-
est is not allowed on all claims. It is generally provided for by statute and is awarded to
plaintiffs in the judges' discretion. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 665 (1988).
Typically, prejudgment interest is awarded only for a liquidated claim. The theory
supporting this rule is that the defendant must know what he owes and that amount must
be due before he can be charged interest for not paying the plaintiff before trial. Id.
§§ 651-654, 659. Accordingly,'in personal injury actions, prejudgment interest will not be
awarded for items such as pain and suffering because those components remain unliquidat-
ed until the trier of fact determines the amount due..In contrast, where the amount due is
determined with reasonable certainty, such as medical expenses and property damage,
prejudgment interest will be awarded. Id. §§ 664, 667.
182. Post-judgment interest is the interest that accrues upon the judgment itself from the
date of judgment until the award is paid. Like prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest
is regulated by statute and is not available on all awards. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Interest and
Usury § 54 (1969). In order to receive such interest, the plaintiff must be "deprived of
the use of the money during the time for which interest has been awarded." Id. State
statutes authorizing post-judgment interest vary as to the type of awards on which post-
judgment interest will be permitted. Id. § 62. See also Morrison, supra note 131, at 46
n.23.
183. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) provides that gross income includes interest. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-7(a) (as amended 1966) ("[I]nterest received by or credited to the taxpayer consti-
tutes gross income and is fully taxable.").
184. I.R.S. PUB. 17, supra note 33, at 77.
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amounts were paid voluntarily."s More simply, an amount re-
ceived is- includible in gross income if it is substitute for an
amount that would be includible if paid in accordance with a con-
tract."8 6  Accordingly, interest received in connection with a
judgment is taxable even where the award itself would be excluded
from income under section 104(a)(2).
Several early authorities considering the tax consequences of
damages and post-judgment interest awards arising from the sinking
of the Lusitania in 1915 illustrate this rule.'8 In I.T. 2420,8'
the taxpayer was awarded $40x as compensation for the death of
her husband and five percent interest on the $40x from November
1923.189 After concluding that the award compensating for the
loss of life was not taxable income, I.T. 2420 held, without elabo-
ration, that the interest was nonetheless taxable."9 Similarly, in
Riddle v. Commissioner the taxpayer received compensatory damag-
es of $15,000 for personal injuries, plus interest of $3,422.191 The
court found that the measure of damages for the personal injury
was $15,000 and that the $3,422 was "separately computed and
specifically designated as interest.""9 As a result, the interest was
includible in income.193
A number of more recent rulings follow the reasoning of I.T.
185. Wheeler v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 459, 461 (1972); Sager Glove Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 36 T.C. 1173, 1180 (1961) ("The taxability of the proceeds of a lawsuit, or of
a sum received in settlement thereof, depends upon the nature of the claim and the actual
basis of recovery."), aft'd, 311 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1962), and cert. denied, 373 U.S. 910
(1963); see also Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31 (1941) (holding that negotiated
settlement for cancellation of a lease should be included in income).
186. See BITrKER, supra note 14, 11 5-43 to 5-44 (noting that tort recoveries are
excludable if they compensate for rights which would be enjoyed tax free); I.R.S. PUB.
17, supra note 33, at 77 ("To determine if settlement amounts you receive by compro-
mise or judgment must be included in income, you must consider the item that the settle-
ment replaces.").
187. Riddle v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1339 (1933); I.T. 2420, VII-2 C.B. 123 (1928).
188. I.T. 2420, Vll-2 C.B. at 123.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 124 (applying the Revenue Act of 1926). See also Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1
C.B. 179 (citing I.T. 2420 as support for excluding proceeds obtained under New Jersey
wrongful death statute from income for tax purposes).
191. 27 B.T.A. 1339, 1339 (1933). Although the Revenue Act of 1928 controlled, the
applicable provision was identical to that in the 1926 Act construed in I.T. 2420. The
taxpayer conceded that interest attributable to that part of the judgment constituting dam-
ages for property loss was taxable. Id. For additional discussion of Riddle's analysis of
the predecessor to § 104(a)(2), see supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
192. Id. at 1341.
193. Id.
1992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
2420 and Riddle and conclude that while section 104(a)(2) excludes
a lump sum payment received as compensation for personal injuries
from gross income, interest earned from the investment of that
payment is not excluded."9 In Revenue Ruling 65-29, the court
awarded the taxpayer a lump sum payment equal to the present
value of the damages caused to his wife by the defendant's tortious
conduct. 95 The Service held that only the lump sum payment is
excludable under section 104(a)(2). The interest accrued on the
lump sum payment was taxable because the taxpayer had "unfet-
tered control over the lump sum payment and over the income
from the investment of such payment.'96 Revenue Ruling 76-
1331" follows similar reasoning. In this ruling, a lump sum set-
tlement was invested in a five-year certificate of deposit. Neither
the principal nor the accrued interest could be withdrawn prior to
maturity. The Service held that although the lump-sum settlement
194. Rev. Rul. 76-133, 1976-1 C.B. 34 (holding that interest earned on certificates of
deposit purchased with an award for personal injury is includible in gross income under
the regulations applicable to -original issue discount"); Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59
(finding that interest income gained from investment of a lump-sum personal injury award
constitutes gross income).
Notwithstanding the authority just cited, the interest may be excluded under
§ 104(a)(2) if it is made an implicit part 'of the damage award. In three revenue rulings,
the Service has specifically held that installment payments of settlements for personal inju-
ry damages will be entirely tax free despite the fact that such future payments contain
implicit interest. Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74 (finding full amount of monthly pay-
ments excludable because payee has a right to receive only the monthly payments and not
the economic benefit of the accrued lump-sum amount); Rev. Rul. 79-313, 1979-2 C.B.
75 (holding all proceeds excludable even though annual settlement payments increased by
five percent each year); Rev. Rul. 77-230, 1977-2 C.B. 214 (finding distributions of in-
come from trust created by settlement agreement excludable from gross income).
In Revenue Ruling 79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75, the taxpayer was to receive 50 annual
payments as compensation for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. Each payment
was to increased by five percent over the amount of the preceding payment. Id. The
Service concluded that all of the paymeits were excludable because the taxpayer had
neither actual or constructive receipt of the economic benefit. It contrasted this conclusion
with Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59, in which the taxpayer actually received the present
value of the award in a lump sum settlement of a personal injury suit. Accord Gen.
Couns. Mem. 37,687 (Sept. 25, 1978); Gen. Cous. Mem. 36,093 (Nov. 29, 1974); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 90-15-046 (Jan. 16, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-33-035 (May 16, 1983) (acknowl-
edging that periodic payments from an annuity purchased by tortfeasor for injured party
are excludable from income); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-25-054 (Mar. 21, 1983).
Section 104(a)(2) was amended in 1983 to provide explicitly that neither lump sum
nor periodic payments may be excluded from income. Act of Jan. 14, 1983, P.L. 97-473,
§ 101, 96 Stat. 2605.
195. Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59.
196. Id. at 60.
197. Rev. Rul. 76-133, 1976-1 C.B. 34.
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was excludable under section 104(a)(2), the interest was includible
in income as original issue discount.19
The more recent case law regarding pre- and post-judgment
interest is also consistent with the Service's rulings. In Wheeler v.
Commissioner1" and Aames v. Commissioner,2°0 the Tax Court
held that post-judgment interest on a damage award was in-
come.
201
Although less clear than the treatment of post-judgment inter-
est, the tax consequences of pre-judgment interest also strengthens
the conclusion that punitive damages are not encompassed within
section 104(a)(2). Under state law, pre-judgment interest arises in
two forms, interest eo nomine, or interest as interest, and interest
as damages.2° Whatever the theory underlying the award, the
amount received is unquestionably interest for federal tax law be-
cause it always represents an amount received for the use or
forbearance of money.2° Several illustrative cases are useful to
demonstrate how such interest is relevant to the taxation of puni-
tive damages.
198. Id. A 1982 Senate report noted Rev. Ruling 76-133 approvingly. S. REP No. 646,
97 Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982). See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,093 (Nov. 29, 1974) (hold-
ing -taxpayer must ... include original issue discount in his gross income").
199. 58 T.C. 459 (1972).
200. 94 T.C. 189 (1990).
201. Aames, 94 T.C. at 193; Wheeler, 58 T.C. at 462. See also In re Air Crash Disas-
ter Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 526 F. Supp. 226, 227 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("In-
terest earned on the invested principle... is, however, subject to federal income taxa-
tion."); Wilson v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health and Human Services, No. 89-65-V,
1990 U.S. Cl. CL LEXIS 186, at *3031 (April 26, 1990) ("While compensation for inju-
ries is not taxable, once it is deemed received by the petitioner, any interest or income
earned thereon is taxable."); McShane v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. 409, 411 (1987) ("It
is also undisputed that... any statutory interest on the final judgment would have been
taxable income under section 61.").
202. See Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. 1985). The
Cavnar court explained the distinction as follows:
Interest as interest is compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for
the use or detention of money. Interest as damages is compensation allowed by
law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during
the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.
Id.
See also 22 AM. JUR. 2D, Damages §§ 648-674 (1988) (discussing generally interest as
an element of damages).
203. Cf. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (holding sale of
building attributable to corporation, not stockholders, because "[t]he incidence of taxation-
depends upon the substance of a transaction").
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In Vertex Investment Company v. Commissioner,204 a corpora-
tion sued a shareholder for misuse of approximately $140,000 in
corporate assets, proceeding on the theory that the funds had been
borrowed. Despite the fact the corporation could have sued on a
tort theory of fraud, it chose to pursue the contract theory for other
reasons."°5 The parties subsequently settled the suit for a payment
consisting of principal and interest. The Board of Tax Appeals
ultimately concluded that it was unnecessary to determine whether
the interest should be treated as damages because the taxpayer was
bound by its own claim alleging a loan with interest. Regarding
the prejudgment interest, the Board stated:
[Pletitioner's contention is that amounts to which a
taxpayer is entitled as damages can be considered neither
as 'income' nor as 'interest' within the meaning of the
revenue acts. That 'damages' may in certain circumstances
constitute taxable income is well established. That
'damages' may constitute 'interest' is also a conclusion
warranted by the authorities, if the so-called damages repre-
sented a payment imposed by law for the use or detention
of money. In Joseph W. Bettendorf, we said: 'Interest is
the compensation allowed by law, or fixed by the parties,
for the use or forbearance of money, or as damages for its
detention', citing 33 Corpus Juris 178. And in the more
recent case of Elverson Corporation, in defining 'interest,
as generally understood' we used, among others, the same
definition. If the amounts received by petitioner in the
instant proceeding in excess of the principal amount
claimed are to be considered as damages for the detention
of money, they will come under the definitions given
above and will constitute interest. In so far as they may be
considered damages for the detention of money, the re-
ceipts in question differ materially from awards of damages
qua damages rendered in legal actions arising from the
conversion, either voluntary or involuntary, of property.
Since the amounts here involved, if considered as such
damages, come within our definition of 'interest', and since
there are no cases involving similar facts which require a
holding to the contrary, we question the validity of
204. 47 B.T.A. 252 (1942)
205. Id. at 259.
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petitioner's contention that amounts to which petitioner
might be entitled as damages can not be
'interest .... 206
The only case authority considering pre-judgment interest in the
context of a personal injury suit is McShane v. Commissioner.3°
In McShane, the jury returned a verdict of $1,275,000 in favor of
the taxpayers for personal injuries suffered in an explosion.' 6 Af-
ter an appeal, the defendants settled for $1,529,134, fearing that a
retrial would result in even greater damages.2" The settlement
represented the trial court's award plus statutory interest computed
from an arbitrarily chosen date, less a five percent discount.210
The Service argued that section 104(a)(2) did not exclude the inter-
est component of the settlement from income. The taxpayers coun-
tered that the settlements were entirely for damages, and so, ex-
cluded by section 104(a)(2).2 '
The Tax Court began its analysis by noting that under state
law each taxpayer would be entitled to statutory interest, or post-
judgment interest, on a final judgment and that such interest would
be included in gross income. In McShane, however, each of the
plaintiffs settled with the defendant prior to any final decision. 12
While the Tax Court agreed with the taxpayer that there was no
fixed indebtedness upon which to compute interest,213 the court
nonetheless reviewed "the settlement agreements and all other evi-
dence . . . in order to determine whether the payments ultimately
received included interest."214 The Tax Court concluded that in-
terest was not a component of the settlement,21 5 and therefore
206. Id. at 257-58 (citations omitted).
207. 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 409 (1987). In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-18-082 (Feb. 8, 1989), the
Service addressed the taxation of interest paid on damages for personal injury. The ruling
concluded that "amounts received... as interest are included in gross income under
section 61(a)(4), and are not excluded under section 104(a)(2)." Id. The ruling did not
specify whether the interest at issue was prejudgment or post-judgment interest. Id. See
also I.R.S. PUB. 17, supra note 33, at 77 ("To determine if settlement amounts you re-
ceive by compromise or judgment must be included in income, you must consider the
settlement that the item replaces. Include the following as ordinary income: 1) Interest on
any award.")
208. McShane, 53 T.C.M. at 410.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 411.
212. Id.
213. A court ordinarily cannot award prejudgment interest where the damages are unliq-
uidated. See supra note 194.
214. McShane, 53 T.C.M. at 412.
215. Id The court based its decision on the following factors: (1) each settlement agree-
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ruled that the entire settlement was excluded by section
104(a)(2).216 Despite the final conclusion, the court's description
of the interest portion of an award as income remained in accor-
dance with earlier rulings.
In other contexts, courts regularly segregate the interest compo-
nent of judgments to aid in determining appropriate tax treatment.
For example, in a series of condemnation cases, several courts held
that the amount awarded as interest was not part of the compensa-
tion or payment for the property and, consequently, was taxable as
ordinary income.217 Similarly, where damages have been awarded
in cases involving stock fraud218 and accountings for partnership
profits,219 courts have generally held that the pre-judgment inter-
est portion of the award is taxable as ordinary income, not as
capital gain from the sale of the asset."
In summary, the conclusion that section 104(a)(2) does not
exclude interest awarded in personal injury actions, whether as in-
terest eo nominee or as damages, supports the proposition that an
award of punitive damages does not fall within the exclusion.
Interest in these cases is not awarded on account of personal inju-
ry, but rather is awarded for the use or forbearance of money or as
damages for detention of money.2' Similarly, punitive damages
are not awarded on account of personal injury; they are awarded
because of defendants' egregious conduct.'
ment provided that it was without costs and interest; (2) the intent of parties was that no
interest was payable; and (3) the settlement was based solely upon risks of litigation and
not the tax consequences of the settlements. The court dismissed the settlement memoran-
dum containing the interest computation as being written after the fact to justify the set-
tlement. Moreover, the settlement memorandum was not prepared by the attorney who
conducted the negotiations.
216. Id.
217. Kieselbach v. Commissioner, 317 U.S. 399 (1943); Spangler v. Commissioner, 323
F.2d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 1963), aft'g 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1783 (1961); Smith v. Commis-
sioner, 59 T.C. 107 (1972); Stewart v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1119, 1123
(1982), aft'd, 714 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1983).
218. Commissioner v. Raphael, 133 F.2d 442, 444 (9th Cir. 1943), rev'g Lang v. Com-
missioner, 45 B.T.A. 256 (1941), nonacq., 1942-1 C.B. 25, and cert. denied, 320 U.S.
735 (1943); Spangler v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1783, 1784 (1961), affj'd, 323
F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1963).
219. Specialty Eng'g Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1173, 1177 (1949).
220. See, e.g., Big Four Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 1055, 1060 (1963) (argu-
ing that to extent the judgment substitutes for a capital asset, recovery of basis is tax free
and the excess amount is taxed at capital gain rates), acq., 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 4.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 194, 201.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 72-84.
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C. Internal Revenue Service's Position After Glenshaw Glass
Subsequent to Glenshaw Glass, the Service held that amounts
received as compensation for personal injury do not constitute
income.' Revenue Ruling 75-45, which holds punitive dam-
ages excludable in income is the single exception to the Service's
otherwise consistent position.' Although the 1975 ruling was
later revoked, it has unfortunately served as the foundation for a
line of cases holding punitive damages excludable from in-
come. 6 An historical analysis reveals the significance of this
ruling and its impact on the taxation of punitive damages.
Beginning with Revenue Ruling 58-418, '  the Service issued
its first pronouncement regarding the taxation of punitive damages
subsequent to Glenshaw Glass. 8 The ruling did not, however,
specifically address section 104(a)(2). It considered the taxation of
a $75x payment received in settlement of a libel suit which sought
$600x in compensatory damages and $350x in exemplary damages.
The Service turned to Glenshaw Glass to resolve the question:
"In... Glenshaw Glass... the Supreme Court... held, in
effect, that the fact that amounts were received as exemplary and
punitive damages from wrongdoers as punishment for their unlaw-
ful conduct does not detract from their character as income to the
recipients." ° The ruling then concluded that where an amount
representing both compensatory and punitive damages is received
in settlement of a libel suit for injury to personal reputation, the
223. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-578, 1958-2 C.B. 38.
224. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47, revk'd, Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
225. See, e.g., Rev. Rul 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18, sups'd, Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B.
51.
226. See, e.g., Burford' v. Commissioner, 642 F.Supp. 635, 636-37 (N.D. Ala. 1986)
(rejecting Rev. Rul. 84-108 and excluding punitive damages received in a wrongful death
action from gross income); Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding punitive damages for defamation excludable); Commissioner v. Miller, 93 T.C.
330 (1989) (holding that the broad language of § 104(a)(2) covers both compensatory and
punitive damages in a defamation action), revd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
227. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18, sups'd, Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51; see
also Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32 (holding punitive damages includible in gross in-
come, while compensatory damages are not).
228. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1955).
229. Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1024 (1927), had determined that dam-
ages for libel and slander are compensatory. See supra text accompanying notes 149-56.
However, as the Service noted, Hawkins neither claimed nor was awarded punitive or
exemplary damages. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18, 19.
230. Id.
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portion representing exemplary damages is includible in in-
come.
231
Subsequently, in Revenue Ruling 58-578, 232 the Service con-
sidered the taxation of proceeds paid by an employer's insurance
company to an injured employee or, in the event of death, to his
beneficiary or personal representative upon the execution of a re-
lease of all claims.23 3 Although not expressly described in the
ruling, the release included claims that might be made pursuant to
the" unidentified jurisdiction's compensatory-type wrongful death
statute.2' The relevance of this release is more apparent upon
closer examination of the nature of wrongful death statutes.
Wrongful death statutes are predominantly of two types, com-
pensatory and punitive.235 Because the ruling held that the pro-
231. Id. Note that the Service allocated the total amount of the award between com-
pensatory and punitive damages based on the amounts requested in the complaint. Id.; see
also Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51 (finding that the taxpayer's complaint represented
the best evidence available for allocation between punitive and compensatory), sups'g Rev.
Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18; Rev. Rul. 75-230, 1975-1 C.B. 93 (basing allocation on
previously paid medical expenses, a sum certain as compared with the speculative nature
of damages for pain and suffering); SANDY KASTEN & BRAD SELIGMAN, TAX ASPECTS OF
LMGATION AND SETTLEMENTS § 3.12 (1989).
232. Rev. Rul. 58-578, 1958-2 C.B. 38, sups'd, Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. The
Service had considered the estate tax consequences of an award pursuant to the New
Jersey "Death by Wrongful Act" statute in Revenue Ruling 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179. Rev-
enue Ruling 54-19 held that the proceeds were not includible in the decedent's gross
estate because he had no right of action or interest in the proceeds at the time of his
death. The ruling went on to note that "compensation for loss of life [is] not embraced in
the general concept of the term 'income.'" Id., 1954-1 C.B. at 180 (citation omitted).
233. Rev. Rul. 58-578, 1958-2 C.B. 38, 39.
234. According to Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,967, the administrative file supporting Revenue
Ruling 58-578 indicated that the release was made, at least in part, with respect to possi-
ble claims under a wrongful death act. General Counsel Memorandum 35,967 noted that
the Revenue Ruling could apply to either compensatory or punitive-type wrongful death
statutes, and it suggested that a revenue ruling making this clear was appropriate. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 35,967 (Aug. 27, 1974), revk'd, Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,398 (Jan. 31, 1978).
See infra text accompanying notes 254-60.
235. At common law, when the victim of a personal injury died, any cause of action
she may have had against the defendant terminated and could not be maintained by her
estate or heirs. The defendant's death also terminated the cause of action. KEETON et al.,
supra note 46, § 125, at 940. In most jurisdictions, statutes have been adopted which
allow the victim's estate or surviving spouse to continue an action, and allow an action
to be continued against a deceased defendant's estate. Such statutes are known as survival
statutes. Survival actions are viewed not as a new cause of action, but as a continuation
of a claim which arose before death. Id. § 126, at 943. Damages in survival actions are
generally limited to "economic loss" suffered by the victim before his death, such as lost
wages and medical expenses. Id. Some jurisdictions permit damages for pain and suffering
or punitive damages if those damages could have been recovered by the victim had she
survived to bring the action herself. Other jurisdictions view such damages as a windfall
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ceeds which arose from a compensatory-type statute were not
includible in gross income, the Service continued to observe the
distinction between compensatory and punitive damages for tax
purposes. 6
Later, in Revenue Ruling 75-45, the Service inexplicably re-
versed its position." This ruling addressed the tax consequences
of insurance proceeds received by the estate of an employee killed
while a passenger in his employer's aircraft.238 The employer's
aircraft insurance policy provided for payment upon the execution
of a release of all claims, including any claims brought under the
wrongful death act of the decedent's state of residence. 9 Ac-
to the victim's heirs and do not permit their recovery. Id.
The common law did not permit the spouse or family of a victim who died as a
result of personal injury to bring a cause of action for such items as a loss of support,
comfort, guidance or emotional distress. This too has been changed in most jurisdictions
by what are known as wrongful death statutes. Id. § 127, at 945. Wrongful death actions,
in contrast to actions under survival statutes, are viewed as "new and independent" causes
of action which "compensate the individual beneficiaries (of the victim) for the loss of
the economic benefits which they might reasonably have expected to receive from the
decedent in the form of support, services or contributions." Id. § 127, at 949.
While most states have separate wrongful death and survival statutes, some simply
expand the damages permitted by the survival statute to include the losses otherwise re-
coverable for the wrongful death. Id. § 127, at 946. Both wrongful death and the survival
statutes are compensatory in nature because they award damages based on the actual harm
suffered by the survivors. Alabama has a unique wrongful death statute. The Alabama
statute is punitive in nature. It awards damages based on the egregiousness of the
defendant's conduct, rather than on any harm suffered from the death. See id. § 127, at
946.
Under the compensatory-type statutes, damages are generally limited to pecuniary
losses or the pecuniary value of losses such as services, comfort and consortium. Damages
for mental grief and anguish or punitive damages are not typically allowed. Id. § 127, at
951. Damages awarded pursuant to these statutes are therefore the compensatory type
excluded from income by § 104(a)(2). Id. Wrongful death statutes which permit recovery
of punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages a closer look at § 104(a)(2).
Determining the appropriate tax treatment of judgments in these cases requires that damag-
es for harm suffered, i.e., compensatory, be separated from those which are based on
defendants' egregious conduct, i.e., punitive.
236. The rationale was confirmed by Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,967. See supra note 234.
237. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47, sups'g Rev. Rul. 58-578, 1958-2 C.B. 38, re-
vk'd, Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32. The Ruling's genesis appears to be a 1972 law
review comment concluding that damages awarded or received under Alabama's wrongful
death statute, a "punitive" wrongful death statute, were not excluded by § 104(a)(2). Rob-
ert H. Brodgen, Comment, Taxability of Damages Under Alabama's Wrongful Death Stat-
ute, 3 CUMBERLAND-SANFORD L. REV. 164, 173 (1972). The proposed draft of Revenue
Ruling 75-45 would have distinguished its conclusion from Revenue Ruling 58-578 on the
basis that the wrongful death act being considered was compensatory in nature. See Gen.
Couns. Mem. 35,967 (Aug. 27, 1974).
238. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
239. Although not identified in the ruling, the jurisdiction was Alabama. Gen. Couns.
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cording to the ruling, a series of court decisions established that
the applicable jurisdiction's wrongful death act was punitive in na-
ture.2' As such, Revenue Ruling 75-45 held that the putiitive
damages received were excludable from gross income. The Service
based its conclusion upon the following simple textual analysis:
Section 104 of the Code is a specific statutory exclusion
from gross income within the "except as otherwise pro-
vided" clause of section 61(a). Section 104(a)(2) excludes
from gross income "the amount of any damages received
(whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal
injuries or sickness." Therefore, under Section 104(a)(2)
any damages, whether compensatory or punitive, received
on account of personal injuries or sickness are excludable
from gross income.241
General Counsel Memorandum 35,967,242 which underlay
Revenue Ruling 75-45, also rejected the application of section
104(a)(2) in the above circumstances. However, its rationale is
unusual and perplexing.243 Instead of focusing on the nature of
the receipts as punitive or compensatory, 2' the Memorandum un-
dertakes an unusually expansive interpretation of section 104(a)(2),
notwithstanding the general rule that exclusions from income are
narrowly construed.245 According to a footnote in the Memoran-
Mem. 35,967 (Aug. 27, 1974).
240. But see Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986) (questioning
whether Alabama's wrongful death act is punitive in nature). See also infra text accompa-
nying notes 284-96.
241. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-2 C.B. 47, revk'd, 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32. See Gen. Couns.
Mem. 35,967 (Aug. 27, 1974).
242. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,967 (Aug. 27, 1974), revk'd Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,398
(Jan. 31, 1978).
243. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,967 noted that, although Rev. Rul. 58-578 arguably applied
to an award pursuant to either type of wrongful death statute, a further ruling was neces-
sary because the Revenue Ruling did not distinguish between the two types of statutes
to inform taxpayers that punitive damages received in connection with personal
injuries are not includible in gross income and because of the published com-
ment in the Cumberland-Sanford Law Review ... that concludes that the
Service could tax proceeds recoverable under Alabama's wrongful death statute.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,967 (Aug. 27, 1974).
244. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,967 (Aug. 27, 1974). Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,967 cited Hort
v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 32 (1941), which held that there was no distinction be-
tween rent and a lump sum settlement of a broken lease for the purpose of determining
income.
245. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Jacobsen, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949).
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dum, "[t]here is nothing in the legislative history of § 104 or the
regulations thereunder indicating that punitive damages awarded in
connection with personal injuries should be includible in gross in-
come."' But this analysis is mistaken. Proper analysis of the
issue should focus on whether or not the legislative history indi-
cates that punitive damages are to be excluded from gross income.
If not, punitive damages are includible in gross income.
General Counsel Memorandum 35,967 also contains the same
errors of statutory interpretation regarding the phrases "as compen-
sation for," "any damages" and "on account of' previously dis-
cussed.247 In particular, it fails to interpret section 104 in light of
the intent of those who drafted the original exclusion contained in
section 213(b)(6).248 The Memorandum falls into the traps of de-
fining the word "damages" as "any damages"249 and of using an
overly broad construction of the phrase "on account of,"  Fur-
ther, it confuses suits seeking lost wages as an element of damages
for personal injury with suits seeking lost wages on other
grounds." Under the general rule requiring that the taxability of
damages be determined by reference to the nature of the underly-
ing claim, 2 compensation for personal injury would be excluded
from income while compensation for lost wages would not be excluded? 3
246. Gen. Courts. Mem. 35,967 at n.1.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 162-72 (Section V).
248. See supra text accompanying note 113.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 114-23.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26.
251. Gen. Courns. Mem. 35,967. For authority distinguishing these types of claims, see,
e.g., Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962) (distinguishing payments for
injury to personal rights from payments for movie rights, the latter a clear accession to
wealth); Meyer v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Tenn. 1959) (distinguishing
payment for injury from release of legal rights); Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 5
(S.D.N.Y. 1943) (distinguishing compensation for injury from payments for release of
personal privilege); 'Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,398 (Jan. 31, 1978), revk'g Gen. Couns. Mem.
35,967.
252. See supra note 44.
253. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,967 recognized the general rule, noting "if the damages are
a substitute for amounts that would have been includible in gross income, the damages
are includible in gross income. Thus, damages received for lost profits or lost wages are
includible in gross income." However, the Memorandum drew further support for its posi-
tion from earlier rulings excluding from gross income settlements of personal injury claims
even though a portion of the claim was considered compensation for lost time under the
Railroad Retirement Tax Act. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,967 (citing Rev. Rul. 61-1, 1961-1
C.B. 14.), revk'd, Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,398 (Jan. 31, 1978). Rev. Rul. 61-1 was ampli-
fied by Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50. Rev. Rul. 85-97 held that the § 104(a)(2) ex-
clusion extends to personal injury damages allocable to lost wages. Rev. Rul. 85-97,
1985-2 C.B. 50. Cf. Norfolk and Western Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 498 (1980) (hold-
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With its pronouncements in Revenue Ruling 75-45 and General
Counsel Memorandum 35,967, the Service appears to adopt a uni-
form application of federal tax consequences for wrongful death
awards. However, there is no legal basis for this position. General
Counsel Memorandum 37,398 noted the lapse in the earlier
opinions' analysis:
The conclusion reached in Rev. Rul. 75-45 also has the
desirable effect of creating uniformity in the treatment of
damages received under the wrongful death statutes of the
various states. On the other hand this consideration does
not in itself furnish a legal basis for the ruling. In an
analogous situation the Tax Court noted that whether
wrongful death damages are includible in the decedent's
estate is subject to a great deal of fortuity due to the dif-
ferent types of wrongful death statues. Nevertheless the
court declined to eliminate the fortuity, although it noted
that there was a great temptation to do so."
Moreover, the analysis in Revenue Ruling 75-45 and General
Counsel Memorandum 35,967 vitiates the rule that state law deter-
mines the nature of an interest or right, and federal law then deter-
mines the tax consequences of that interest or right."s5
Just three years later, the Service issued General Counsel Mem-
orandum 37,398 revoking General Counsel Memorandum
35,967.256 This latter Memorandum concluded that exemplary
damages received pursuant to a court award of damages for person-
al injury in a malicious prosecution action was income and, as
such, not excluded by section 104(a)(2). General Counsel
Memorandum 37,398 also provided a much more extensive and
thoughtful analysis than the revoked memorandum. After conclud-
ing that section 104(a)(2) applied to nonphysical personal injuries,
ing that the lower court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that damages for lost wages
are excluded from gross income).
254. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,398 at n.2 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
255. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 474 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) ("[S]tate law creates legal inter-
ests but the federal statute determines when and how they shall be taxed."); MERTENS,
supra note 9, § 4.05.
256. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,398 (Jan. 31, 1978), revk'g Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,967 (Aug.
27, 1974).
257. Id.
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it addressed the taxation of punitive damages. 8 It concluded that
while Revenue Ruling 75-45 was a "plausible interpretation of the
statutory language,... the contrary conclusion is more appropri-
ate." 9 The Service based this conclusion on a strict construction
of the exemption statute and a determination that Congress' under-
lying purpose was to exclude only payments that were re-
storative.2
6°
Subsequently, Revenue Ruling 75-45 was revoked by Revenue
Ruling 84-108,261 which considered the wrongful death acts of
Virginia and Alabama. According to the 1984 Revenue Ruling, the
Virginia act was a compensatory-type wrongful death statute, while
Alabama's statute was "punitive in nature."262 In this ruling, the
Service adopted the compensation theory to explain which awards
are excludable under section 104(a)(2). After discussing Glenshaw
Glass2 63 and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Starrells v. Commis-
sioner,2  the Service held that "punitive damages are not award-
ed 'on account of personal injury,' as required by section
104(a)(2). Instead, they are determined with reference to the
defendant's degree of fault."26 Accordingly, the proceeds re-
ceived under the compensatory-type Virginia act were excluded
from gross income under section 104(a)(2), while the proceeds
received under the punitive-type Alabama act were included.
VII. RECENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EXEMPTION
Six recent opinions consider the application of section 104(a)(2)
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.; accord I.R.S. PUB. 17, supra note 33, at 77, which states:
Damages. Do not include in income any compensation you receive for damage
to your character or for personal injury and illness. Damages for personal in-
jury and illness are not income regardless of whether you receive a lump sum
award or installments. Include in income any punitive damages and compensa-
tion you receive for lost wages or lost profits. Interest on the award must be
included in income.
261. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47, revk'd, Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 34;
see also Gen. Cours. Mem. 39,390 (Aug. 1, 1985) (reaffirming Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,398
and Rev. Rul. 84-108).
262. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. at 33. For a discussion of the difference between
compensatory- and punitive-type wrongful death statutes, see supra note 235.
263. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
264. 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962), aff'g 35 T.C. 646 (1961).
265. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. at 34.
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to punitive damages.2' In addition, the Supreme Court has re-
cently construed section 104(a)(2) in relation to compensatory
damages received in settlement of an employment discrimination
claim.2' This section reviews those decisions.
A. Roemer v. Commissioner
One of the recent judicial pronouncements is the Tax Court's
decision in Roemer v. Commissioner.26s A jury awarded Mr.
Roemer $40,000 as compensatory damages and $250,000 as puni-
tive damages in an action for libel. The Tax Court determined that
the compensatory damages were predominately for injury to his
business and professional reputation as an insurance broker rather
than for injury to his personal reputation. 26 ' Finding that the sec-
tion 104(a)(2) exclusion is limited to compensation for personal
injuries as opposed to professional ones, the Tax Court held that
the compensatory damages should not be excluded from in-
come.
270
The court then considered taxation of the $250,000 awarded as
punitive damages.27' While noting that punitive damages were not
considered income prior to Glenshaw Glass, it acknowledged that
Glenshaw Glass distinguished compensatory damages from punitive
damages by concluding that the latter did not restore capital for tax
purposes.272  The Tax Court also examined Revenue Ruling
58-418, which held that exemplary damages awarded in a libel suit
for injury to personal reputation were income,2' but found that
the ruling did "not relate to the specific exclusion from gross in-
come of section 104(a)(2)." 274 In dicta, the Tax Court addressed
266. Miller _v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 586, 590 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'g 93 T.C. 330
(1989); Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983), nonacq., Rev. Rul.
85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55; O'Gilvie v. United States, Civ. A. No. 90-1075-B, 1992 WL
123,806 (D.Kan. May 26, 1992); Kemp v. Comm'r, 771 F. Supp. 357 (N.D.Ga. 1991),
appeal dismissed, No. 91-8610 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 1991); Burford v. United States, 642 F.
Supp. 635, 637-38 (N.D. Ala. 1986); Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982).
267. United States v. Burke, 60 U.S.L.W. 4404 (U.S. May 26, 1992), rev'g 929 F.2d
1119 (6th Cir. 1991).
268. 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
269. Id. at 406-07. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with this conclusion. Roemer, 716 F.2d
at 700.
270. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 407.
271. Id. at 407-08.
272. Id. at 407.
273. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18.
274. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 407.
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Revenue Ruling 75-45. The court apparently questioned the
Ruling's conclusion "that any damages, whether compensatory or
punitive, received 'on account of personal injuries or sickness' are
excludable from gross income." 75 According to the court,
[slince this interpretation arguably comes within the lan-
guage of section 104(a)(4)[sic], the Commissioner, in his
administrative discretion, has chosen to allow punitive
damages to be excluded from gross income' in the same
manner as compensatory damages provided they arise out
of a personal injury. Otherwise, an award of punitive dam-
ages in a libel suit must be included in gross income and
taxed like other gain.2" 6
Consequently, the Tax Court held that Mr. Roemer must in-
clude the compensatory damages in his gross income because those
damages were awarded for injury to his business reputation rather
than to his personal reputation. Similarly, the punitive damages
were to be included in income because they were also not awarded
"on account of personal injuries."2"
The Tax Court's opinion in Roemer is important for two rea-
sons. First, it highlights the difference between punitive and com-
pensatory damages." Second, by questioning the Service's ratio-
nale and holding in Revenue Ruling 75-45,79 it provides a foun-
dation for further criticism of the view that punitive damages fall
within the section 104(a)(2) exclusion.
However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court decision,
finding that the compensatory damages awarded to Mr. Roemer
were on account of a personal injury and, thus, ex6luded by sec-
tion 104(a)(2).2" Regarding the punitive damages awarded to Mr.
Roemer, the Ninth Circuit stated:
275. Id. at 408. The Tax Court cast further doubt on the Service's ruling in a footnote.
Id. at 408 n.4. The Tax Court referred to Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 as well as several Cali-
fornia cases in concluding "that under California law, punitive damages relate to the
defendant's oppression, fraud and malice and are not directly related to personal injuries
suffered by the plaintiff." Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 407.
279. Id. at 408.
280. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'g 79 T.C. 398 (1982).
In its statement of nonacquiescence, the Service strenuously contested the Ninth Circuit's
opinion on this issue, arguing that damages received on account of injury to professional
rather than personal reputation are income. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55, 56.
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Normally, an amount awarded for punitive damages is
includible in gross income as ordinary income .... Never-
theless, the Commissioner liberally interprets § 104(a)(2) to
exclude punitive damages as well as all compensatory
damages where there has been a personal injury. Therefore,
according to the Commissioner's own interpretation, the
punitive damages received by Roemer on account of his
§ 104(a)(2) personal injury (the defamation) are excludable
from gross income.28'
The vitality of the Ninth Circuit's decision is questionable in
light of the Service's current interpretation of the exclusion and its
revocation of Revenue Ruling 75-45.2 On the other hand, at
least one commentator has sharply criticized the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Roemer for the court's failure to question sua sponte the
Service's interpretation of section 104(a)(2). 8 3
B. Burford v. United States
Burford v. United States' 4 was the next case to address the
taxation of punitive damages under section 104(a)(2). Specifically,
Burford considered the taxation of settlement proceeds received in
an Alabama wrongful death claim. The court began its opinion by
noting that "[tihe starting place in the construction of any statute is
with the language of the statute itself."28 5 Despite this pronounce-
ment, however, the court failed to examine the applicable language
critically. It simply wrote that "[tjhe clear import of 'any damages
received ... on account of personal injuries' would seem to ex-
press clearly the Congressional intent to exclude wrongful death
proceeds - regardless of whether those proceeds are classified as
compensatory or punitive - from gross income.286 Such a defin-
itive conclusion about a controversial aspect of income taxation
demonstrates the court's failure to adequately address the is-
281. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 700 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In Church v. Com-
missioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1110 n.7 (1983), the Service conceded that punitive damages are
excluded from gross income by section 104(a)(2) provided that those damages arise out of
a personal injury.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 261-65.
283. Morrison, supra note 131, at 53-55, 80-83.
284. 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
285. Id. at 636.
286. Id.
[Vol. 42:339
TAXATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
sues.287 Moreover, such a sweeping interpretation of the statute
violates the rule that exclusions from income are to be narrowly
construed.288
Instead of examining the history of section 104(a)(2) to better
understand its intended purposes, the court merely focused its at-
tention on the disparate tax treatment accorded damages received
under wrongful death statutes depending on their nature as either
compensatory, as in Virginia, or punitive, as in Alabama.289 This
misguided perspective lead the court to reach a conclusion which
does not comport with a careful historical analysis of the tax provi-
sion. The disparity which concerned the Burford court does not
arise from inconsistent tax treatment of damages. The tax treatment
is consistent; state laws dictating the nature of remedies for injuries
are disparate.
The Burford court may have been correct in noting that the
proceeds would be tax free if a claim were brought under the
Federal Tort Claims Act or the law of another state.2' 9 However,
the laws of other jurisdictions are inapposite. The court's com-
parison of results highlights its failure to understand the manner in
which federal tax law relates to local law. The Internal Revenue
Code is superimposed upon local, i.e., non-tax, law to determine
the tax consequences of applicable remedies.29' Consequently, the
law of the governing jurisdiction determines the nature of the dam-
ages.
Burford also responded to the Service's position as expressed
in the then-recent Revenue Ruling 84-108.292 According to the
court, "Revenue Ruling 84-108 constitutes an unwarranted admin-
istrative amendment of the clear language of the Internal Revenue
Code . . ,291 It incorrectly found that "[t]he service's traditional
position on punitive wrongful death ... [is that they] are
excludable from gross income."29 In the court's view, "[o]nly a
contorted reading of section 104(a)(2) could lead to the interpreta-
tion that wrongful death proceeds are not received on accidental
287. See supra notes text accompanying notes 118-34.
288. See infra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
289. See supra text accompanying note 235.
290. Burford, 642 F. Supp. at 637 n.4.
291. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
292. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 33 (finding damages awarded under the Ala-
bama wrongful death statute punitive and, therefore, includible in income).
293. Burford, 642 F. Supp. at 636.
294. Id.
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injury."295 As such, it rejected the Revenue Ruling's conclusion
as "neither logical nor realistic."29 Contrary to the Burford
court's assertion, however, the Service's position from the inception
of federal tax law has been that only damages which compensate
for injuries are excluded from income. Thus, Revenue Ruling 84-
108 represented a return to the Service's long-standing position
prior to Revenue Ruling 75-45.
C. Rickel v. Commissioner
Subsequently, the Tax Court and the Third Circuit considered
the taxation of punitive damages awarded on account of a personal
injury in Rickel v. Commissioner.2 " Rickel involved liquidated
damages awarded for a violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).298 The principal issue before
the Tax Court and Third Circuit was whether such a claim was in
the nature of an action for breach of contract or for a tort or tort-
type injury.'" After concluding that a portion of the damages
awarded was compensation for a tort-like injury," the Tax Court
295. Id at 637.
296. Id.
297. 92 T.C. 510 (1989), affid in part and rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Ci. 1990).
298. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1985)
299. Rickel, 92 T.C. at 515. Rickel split the award equally between the two types of
claims, contract and tort. Id at 522. Consequently, the portion attributable to the contract
claim was included in income while the portion received on account of the tort claim was
excluded from income. Id. The Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court's separation of the
award. Rickel, 900 F.2d at 664. The circuit court adopted the Ninth Circuit's analysis in
Roemer that once the nature of an injury is determined to be personal, the damages that
flow from the injury are excluded. For other cases focusing on the personal nature of the
underlying claim, see Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211 (3rd Cir. 1989) (determining
the entire award for compensation of economic loss pursuant to Fair Labor Standards Act
and New Jersey wrongful discharge law was for violation of personal right); Bent v.
Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987) (concluding that recovery for violation of the
First Amendment is excludable); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986) (holding
that recovery for injury to professional reputation is personal and thus excludable), aftid,
848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988). But see Pistillo v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 874
(1989) (deciding that backpay is not excludable under § 104(a)(2)), rev'd, 912 F.2d 145
(6th Cir. 1990), overruled by Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150 (1991); Wirtz v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1596 (1989) (holding damages awarded under the ADEA
included in gross income because they were wage-related and distinguishing Rickel be-
cause the jury found no willful violation of ADEA which would constitute a tort-like
injury).
300. Rickel, 92 T.C. at 521. The court distinguished the remedies available under the
FLSA, which include "'unpaid minimum wages' or 'unpaid overtime compensation,' as
well as an equal amount of mandatory 'liquidated damages'" from those available under
the ADEA such as "compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the
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addressed the Service's argument that the amounts were nonetheless
taxable as punitive damages." The court was "concerned with
the nature of the award in the hands of the recipient, and from that
standpoint it [was] compensatory."3"2 Furthermore, it noted that
"the liquidated damages available under the ADEA are intended to
compensate for those difficult to measure personal injuries that are
the consequence of age discrimination."' Thus, the court held
that "gross income does not include liquidated damages received
under a 29 U.S.C. § 626 claim based on a violation of petitioner's
statutory right to be free from discrimination on the basis ,of
age."3 4
A careful reading of Rickel confirms that the Tax Court recog-
nized that different tax consequences follow from a characterization
of an award as compensatory or punitive. The court undertook an
extensive and thoughtful analysis of the nature of damages awarded
under the ADEA. Such an analysis would be unnecessary if the
court concluded that all punitive damages awarded in a personal
injury action are excluded by section 104(a)(2).
On appeal, the Third Circuit considered the Service's position
regarding the taxation of punitive damages awarded in personal
injury cases in connection with the Service's decision not to award
the taxpayer reasonable litigation expenses under section 7430.305
liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensa-
tion." I4 at 518. The court noted that violations of the ADEA typically do not involve a
failure to pay minimum or overtime wages and, therefore, monetary damages are more
difficult to measure. The Court also observed with respect to the ADEA that "monetary
awards may deter employers from engaging in prohibited employment practices. In that
sense, they are punitive in nature .... [Mionetary awards also recompense individuals
for injuries caused by their employers' discriminatory conduct." Id. at 521.
A complete discussion of whether damages awarded under the ADEA are compensa-
tory or punitive in nature is beyond the scope of this article. The Supreme Court has
noted that the "legislative history of the ADEA indicates that Congress intended for liqui-
dated damages to be punitive in nature.- Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S.
111, 125 (1985). The Rickel Tax Court concluded, however, that the liquidated damages
under the ADEA are "intended to compensate for... personal injuries that are the con-
sequence of age discrimination" and held them excluded from gross income. Rickel, 92
T.C. at 522.
301. Ricke!, 92 T.C. at 521. In Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150 (1991), the Tax
Court overruled its earlier decision that baeckpay awarded as non-liquidated damages for an
Age Discrimination Act claim cannot be excluded under § 104(a)(2).
302. Id. (emphasis added).
303. Id. at 522.
304. Id.
305. Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'g in part and
rev'g in part 92 T.C. 510 (1989). I.ILC. § 7430 provides that the prevailing party may
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The Third Circuit determined that the Service's position was sub-
stantially justified. 3°6
[I]t was not unreasonable for the Commissioner to have
interpreted Glenshaw Glass as standing for the proposition
that all punitive damage awards are includible in gross
income. Although the court [sic] in Glenshaw Glass was
apparently considering only whether treble damages under
the antitrust laws were taxable under the I.R.C., its lan-
guage was much broader: "Damages for personal injury are
by definition compensatory only. Punitive damages, on the
other hand, cannot be considered a restoration of capital for
taxation purposes.". .. Both courts and commentators have
generally interpreted Glenshaw Glass as having enunciated
the broader proposition.' °7
Although only dicta as it relates to section 104(a)(2), the Third
Circuit appeared to acknowledge merit in the Service's position
that punitive damages are not covered by the exclusion.31
D. Miller v. Commissioner
The most recent Tax Court decision to consider the punitive
damage issue was Miller v. Commissioner." Miller involved the
taxation of $525,000 received in settlement of a $950,000 jury
award in two defamation actions. The jury award allocated
$500,000 for compensatory damages and $450,000 for punitive
damages." ° Following its reasoning in Rickel,311 the Tax Court
excluded both the compensatory and punitive damages from gross
income pursuant to section 104(a)(2). 312 By repeating the Rickel
be awarded reasonable administrative and litigation costs. The "prevailing party" is defined
as any party (other than the U.S. or any creditor of the taxpayer) which established that
the United States' position was substantially unjustified, and has substantially prevailed
with respect to the amount in controversy or with respect to the most significant issue or
set of issues presented. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2).
306. Rickel, 900 F.2d at 666.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 666-67.
309. 93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
310. Id. at 333.
311.. Id. at 335-36. The Tax Court refused to follow its decision in Roemer v. Com-
missioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), which was subsequently adopted by the Service in Rev-
enue Ruling 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55. The court followed the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Roemer instead. See supra text accompanying notes 280-83.
312. Miller, 93 T.C. at 341. The Service took the position that the entire settlement
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analysis, the Miller opinion also repeated the same analytic and
interpretational errors.
The genesis of the Tax Court's error was its failure to recog-
nize and appreciate the ambiguities inherent in the statute. In ex-
amining the exclusion, the Tax Court found that the statute had a
"plain meaning. " 3
[At the time the predecessor to section 104(a)(2) was enact-
ed,] the availability of punitive or exemplary damages had
long been established .... Congress, aware of that fact,
could have excluded only "compensatory damages" or
provided that only damages received "as compensation for"
personal injuries be excluded. Cf. Browning-Ferris Indus-
tries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc .... (Fram-
ers of the Bill of Rights, aware of punitive damages, could
have subjected them to Eighth Amendment limitation if
they had so intended.). It did neither, and the plain mean-
ing of the broad statutory language simply does not permit
a distinction between punitive and compensatory damages.
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947) ("the words
of statutes - including revenue acts - should be inter-
preted where possible in their ordinary, everyday senses.").
Thus, we read "any damages" to mean "all" damages,
including punitive damages. Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary (198 1).314
The error in this conclusion lies in the lack of any meaningful
analysis of the legislative history or statutory language."' More-
over, the court failed to consider the word "damages" separately
from the phrase "any damages." Because the plain meaning of the
word "damages" is quite different than the definition employed by
the Tax Court, the court's conclusion is, at best, tenuous. A more
careful and narrow construction would compel a decision that the
word "damages" does not encompass punitive damages unless
constituted punitive damages because the taxpayer failed to establish the portion of the net
settlement proceeds which represented excludable compensatory damages. Id. at 337-38.
Proper practice should be to make such an allocation of settlement proceeds as a matter
of course, especially if the views of the author are adopted.
313. At at 338. The court cited Burford as having held that the statute "is susceptible
of only one reasonable interpretation.- Id
314. Id. at 338.
315. According to the court, the legislative history provided "no sound basis for disre-
garding the plain meaning of the statute." Id. at 341.
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punitive damages are specifically included in a statutory defini-
tion.316
Similarly, the Tax Court incorrectly defined the phrase "as
compensation." With respect to this term, the court failed to recog-
nize that a reasonable interpretation of the 1918 version of section
104(a)(2) permitted its application to, and limitation of, the "any
damages" clause.317 As a result of the Tax Court's failure to un-
dertake an historic analysis, its conclusion does not comport with
the original drafters' intention.
Construing the phrase "on account of," the Tax Court referred
to Revenue Ruling 75-45 and noted that "[alt one time, the Com-
missioner also viewed the statute as free from ambiguity."318 The
court then criticized the Service's rationale in Revenue Ruling 84-
108, which revoked Revenue Ruling 75-45, concluding that "[t]he
Commissioner has given the statute a strained and unnatural inter-
pretation." " To support its contrary position, the Tax Court sim-
ply turned to Webster's Dictionary to define the phrase "on ac-
count of."320 Webster's suggested that a type of causation is im-
plicit in the phrase, a characteristic tending to support the conclu-
sion that punitive damages should be treated in the same manner
as compensatory. The court further noted that in most jurisdictions
punitive damages are not available unless some actual or compen-
satory damages are also awarded. Based on this rule, the court rea-
soned that "punitive damages are received 'on account of' personal
injury, although personal injury alone may not justify an award of
punitive damages. 321 Consequently, the court ruled that compen-
satory and punitive damages are interchangeable for purposes of
the section 104(a)(2) exclusion.
In a sharply worded and critical dissent, Judge Whalen made a
far more incisive analysis of the phrase. Appropriately, Judge
Whalen began his opinion with an extensive analysis of Maryland
law to determine the nature of the taxpayer's claims.32 He con-
cluded that:
under Maryland law [the taxpayer's] claim for punitive
316. See supra text accompanying notes 114-23.
317. Miller, 93 T.C. at 341.
318. Id. at 339.
319. Id.
320. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY (1981)).
321. Id. at 340.
322. Id. at 344-50 (Whalen, J., dissenting).
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damages is not an adjunct to or substitute for compensatory
damages, but represents an entirely different claim based
upon different proof and a different theory than her claim
for compensatory damages .... [Plunitive damages...
represent a form of civil punishment.3"
Based on this finding about the underlying award, he rejected
the majority's "causation" analysis. He noted that under Maryland
law, at least with respect to a defamation action, the plaintiff is
"presumed to have been injured... and is entitled to compen-
satory and punitive damages without a showing of actual inju-
ry."3"' Judge Whalen also observed that the majority confused the
prerequisites for asserting the defamation claim with the nature of
the claim itself.
32
Although the Miller court pieced together support for its posi-
tion, such reasoning can hardly substitute for a careful historical
examination of the exemption. Interestingly, toward the end of the
opinion the Tax Court referred back to the exclusion's origin.
Including punitive damages within the ambit of section
104(a)(2) does not produce an absurd result. Punitive dam-
ages have served as a means of compensating plaintiffs for
intangible, harm and for costs and attorneys' fees ....
Although they may serve these purposes to a lesser extent
now than in the past, the fact that punitive damages may
possess a compensatory aspect renders it reasonable to
afford them the protection of section 104(a)(2). It also
might explain why in 1918 Congress did not expressly
limit the statutory exclusion to compensatory damages.
326
If taken at face value, the Tax Court's statement indicates that
it misunderstood the fundamental difference between compensatory
323. Id. at 346.
324. Id at 350 (emphasis added).
325. Id Judge Whalen criticized the majority's approach as inconsistent with earlier
cases distinguishing different types of damages "caused" by personal injury. Id. at 351
(citing a number of opinions distinguishing damages for lost wages from damages for
personal injuries). While Judge Whalen was correct in recognizing this inconsistency, he
erred in concurring with those opinions. Both Whalen and the earlier cases overlooked the
point that lost wages are one measure of the compensation excluded by § 104(a)(2). In
contrast, punitive damages are not, and never were, intended to compensate plaintiffs for
their injuries. The Third Circuit recognized this further distinction in partially reversing the
Rickel Tax Court. Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 664 (3d Cir. 1990), rev'g in
part 92 T.C. 510 (1989).
326. Id. at 341.
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and punitive damages. Viewed cynically, the statement casts doubt
on the intellectual honesty of the opinion's preceding rationale,
making them appear purely result-oriented. Although compassionate
to the taxpayer, this Tax Court's approach makes for poor tax law.
The Tax Court's opinion in Miller v. Commissioner was defi-
cient in several other respects as well. For example, the opinion
did not address the court's previous expressions of doubt concern-
ing the Service's "liberal" interpretation of the statutory exclu-
sion.327 In particular, the Miller court failed to mention the obser-
vation made in Burford that Glenshaw Glass is generally thought
to stand for the broader proposition that punitive damages are not
excluded from gross income.28 The court thus inappropriately
applied an Eighth Amendment interpretation of damages to an
exclusion section.329
In addition, while it is interesting that punitive damages existed
in the law of torts when Congress enacted the predecessor of sec-
tion 104(a)(2), but that fact is not as probative as the Tax Court
suggests.330 As discussed above, it appears that Congress intended
not to tax amounts paid to taxpayers to compensate for their losses
and to make them whole. Loss compensation is not the function or
purpose of punitive damages; "punitive damages are a windfall to
the plaintiff [and] ... an incentive for plaintiffs to bring petty
99331outrages into court ....
The Tax Court's Miller opinion stands alone in construing
section 104(a)(2) as excluding punitive damages from gross income
if Burford is interpreted generously as holding that Alabama's
wrongful death statute is compensatory in nature and the Roemer
decision is viewed as lacking vitality because of the Service's
subsequent reversal of its position.332 However, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the Tax Court, correctly reasoning that the portion of the
settlement allocable to punitive damages is taxable.333 The Fourth
327. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir.
1983).
328. Burford v. Commissioner, 642 F. Supp. 635, 637 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
329. Id. at 638.
330. Miller, 93 T.C. at 338 ('Punitive damages have long been a part of traditional
state tort law.").
331. KEETON et al., supra note 46, at 14.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 268-96.
333. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 591 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'g 93 T.C. 330
(1989). The Fourth Circuit remanded the case for an allocation of the settlement between
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 592.
[V/ol. 42:339
TAXATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Circuit's approach is more consistent with legislative intent and
prior judicial decisions than the Tax Court's.
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by examining "the nature
of the cause of action and the injury to be remedied."3" It found
that, under Maryland law, a defamation action is an action for
personal injury.335 The court emphasized the distinction between
punitive and compensatory damages.
A punitive damages award 'does not attempt to compensate
the plaintiff for harm suffered by him, but rather is exem-
plary in nature and is over and above any award of com-
pensatory damages .... [E]xemplary or punitive damages,
as the name connotes, are rather a punishment for and
deterrent to wrongdoing [rather] than a means of recom-
pensing the victim. To the victim they are a windfall not
necessarily related to the injury he has suffered.3"
The court proceeded to reject the Tax Court's conclusion that
"the 'plain meaning' of section 104(a)(2) compels exclusion of
punitive damages from gross income."37 Although it agreed with
the Tax Court that "causation" is suggested by the phrase "on
account of," the appeals court found that the Tax Court failed to
distinguish between "but for" causation and "sufficient" causa-
tion.3 8 First, the Fourth Circuit summarized the "but for" causa-
tion analysis:
The fact that a plaintiff has to sustain a personal injury as
a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages leads to the
conclusion that the punitive damages were 'on account of'
the plaintiff's injury, even though a punitive damage award
requires the additional showing of, and is responsive only
to, egregious conduct by the defendant.3
3 9
It then contrasted "sufficient causation."
The fact that personal injury is a prerequisite to puni-
tive damages does not lead to the conclusion that the puni-
334. Id. at 589 (quoting Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709, 711 (4th Cir.
1989)).
335. Id (citing New York, Phila. and Norfolk R.R. v. Waldron, 82 A. 709, 711 (Md.
1911)).
336. Id. (footnote omitted).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. (footnote omitted).
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tive damages were 'on account of' the plaintiff's injuries
because, even if the other elements of the tort are present,
personal injury alone does not sustain a punitive damage
award. The fact that a plaintiff seeking punitive damages
has to show egregious conduct by the defendant indicates
that the plaintiff's injury was not a sufficient cause of the
punitive damages. Thus, the mere fact that 'on account of'
suggests 'causation' does not answer the question of wheth-
er 'on account of' suggests but-for causation or sufficient
causation.'
Given these variations, the court concluded that section
104(a)(2) is ambiguous. 341 To resolve the ambiguity, the court
turned to two principles of statutory construction. First, exclusions
from income are to be narrowly construed,' 4 and second, the
statute should be interpreted in a manner that furthers the under-
lying purpose of the law. 43 Adhering to these two principles, the
court adopted the Service's "more restrictive" interpretation as
"comport[ing] better with the section's underlying purpose" to ex-
clude damages for personal injury from gross income "'because, in
effect, they restore a loss to capital."' 3"
The Fourth Circuit also characterized the Tax Court's reliance
on Burford as "misplaced." 45 It read Burford as having found
the Alabama wrongful death statute compensatory.' In contrast,
punitive damages awarded under the defamation statute in Miller
served purely to punish the wrongdoer and not to compensate the
plaintiff in any way.' Consequently, the differences in the un-
derlying claims warranted different tax treatment of the resulting
damages.
From Miller it is clear that, at least in the Fourth Circuit, de-
termining the amount of damages that may properly be excluded
from income under section 104(a)(2) requires an examination of
340. Id. at 589-90.
341. Id. at 590.
342. Id. (citing Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949)).
343. Id
344. Id. (citing Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962)).
345. Id.
346. Id. ("[Tihe Burford court's close inspection of Alabama law uncovered an Alabama
case 'rejecting the precise argument advanced in [Burford]-that such damages are ob-
tained for punitive rather than compensatory purposes.'" (quoting Burford v. United States,
642 F. Supp. 635, 637 (N.D. Ala. 1986))).
347. Id.
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both the type of injury and the type of damages received."8
E. United States v. Burke
In United States v. Burke,3' 9 the Supreme Court considered
the taxation of settlements awarded in Title VII claims.s ° Al-
though the opinion considers directly only the taxation of Title VII
awards, the opinion may have more far-reaching effect. Burke
probably supports the thesis of this article that punitive damages
awarded in personal injury cases are not excluded from income.
The opinion is less than clear, however, and may not provide a
guiding principle upon which future punitive damage cases may be
determined. Thus, the opinion only adds to the confusion surround-
ing the tax consequences of punitive damages.
The Burke opinion concludes that awards in Title VII cases are
not subject to the exclusion of section 104(a)(2).51 Although the
proper taxation of damages under Title VII is beyond the scope of
this article, a persuasive argument can be made that the Court's
result is correct. However, the Court's underlying rationale was
not carefully articulated, and the opinion contains dicta which may
cause confusion when punitive damages are at issue.
The Court reaches a result which appropriately applies section
348. Id. The taxpayer argued that past decisions compelled a result in her favor. The
Fourth Circuit disagreed, commenting that "the making of an error does not recommend,
let alone necessitate, its repetition.- Id. at 591 (citing Becker v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d
146, 150 (3d Cir. 1984)). Because the parties to the underlying settlement failed to allo-
cate the sum between compensatory and punitive damages, the Fourth Circuit remanded.
Id at 592.
349. 60 U.S.L.W. 4404 (U.S. May 26, 1992). See also Crossin v. United States, No.
91-C-5029, 1992 WL 87,914 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1991) (reaching same conclusion as
Burke).
350. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West Supp.
1992). Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2.
351. Burke, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4407. In Leib v. Commissioner, 1992-354 T.C. Memo.
(June 23, 1992), the taxpayer contended that a payment in settlement of a sex discrimina-
tion suit was excluded by § 104(a)(2), as it was in the nature of a tort action. The Tax
Court dismissed the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment. Citing Burke, the court
held that there was a question of material fact at least to the extent the claim related to
a Title VII claim or other claims which might result in including some or all of the
payment in income. The bifurcation of the backpay claim from other claims may represent
a departure from earlier decisions in which once it was determined that a tort or tort
claim was present, all other causes of action were merged, notwithstanding that the other
claims would have resulted in income inclusion.
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104(a)(2) narrowly.352 It also purports to follow traditional section
104(a)(2) analysis examining the nature of the claim to determine
the tax consequences of the damages received.35 3 But the Court's
discussion emphasizes remedial measures in a manner apt to con-
tinue confusion in this area.
A more thoughtful articulation by the Court would have placed
greater emphasis on elements other than remedies to distinguish be-
tween tort and contract actions." Its analysis of the difference in
traditional remedies led to unfortunate dicta. The Court noted that
compensatory and punitive damages are traditional remedies for tort
or tort-like claims. 55 The Court contrasted then-applicable Title
VII remedies, which generally were limited to backpay. Backpay
is a remedy for commonly associated with contract actions.
This dicta may lead to future conundrums for lower courts.
The relevant statutory provision excludes from gross income "any
damages" awarded "on account of' personal injury., This dicta
arguably could be read as supporting an argument that the phrase
"any damages" includes both compensatory and punitive damages.
This interpretation would restrict the Court's adoption of the nar-
rower construction of this phrase suggested earlier.3"6
The phrase "on account of" remains the avenue for the Court
to reach the proper result. Without regard to the merits of the
proposition that punitive damages are a traditional remedy for
torts,357 as argued earlier, punitive damages are not awarded "on
352. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
353. Burke, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4406. The Court recognizes the nature of the claim analy-
sis in two footnotes. In the first, the Court notes "the concept of a 'tort' is inextricably
bound up with remedies - specifically damages actions. Thus, we believe that
consideration of the remedies available . . . is critical in determining the 'nature of the
statute' and the *type of claim' brought . . . for purposes of § 104(a)(2)." Id. at 4406
n.7. This language suggests that, despite the emphasis placed on the remedy, the Court
used the traditional analysis of § 104(a)(2). See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
In the second footnote, the Court notes that Congress has recently expanded the
remedial scope of Title VII to allow recovery of compensatory damages other than
backpay and punitive damages. Burke, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4407 n.12. The Court did not
consider the change as affecting its analysis of the statute as it existed when Burke's
injury arose. Id
354. The Court "agree[dJ with the Court of Appeals* analysis insofar as it focused, for
purposes of § 104(a)(2), on the nature of the claim underlying respondents' damage
award." Id at 4406.
355. Id at 4405-06. The measure of damages in traditional tort cases often is deter-
mined in an "economic character," to use the Court's language. Id at 4407. In order to
prove compensatory damages, the monetary value of injuries sustained must be proved.
For example, the compensation for a tort is often measured by the amount of lost wages.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 114-23.
357. Punitive damages are not traditionally awarded in tort cases, but must be specially
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account of" personal injury, but rather are awarded "on account of"
the defendant's egregious conduct. The Burke opinion's narrow
interpretation of section 104(a)(2) suggests the Court would similar-
ly interpret the phrase "on account of' narrowly.
F. Kemp v. Commissioner and O'Gilvie v. United States
Two recent district court decisions held on summary judgment
that punitive damages received were includible in gross income and
not excluded by section 104(a)(2). Both Kemp v. Commissioner'"8
and O'Gilvie v. United States359 concluded that punitive damages
are not awarded "on account of' personal injuries.3" Each court
found that punitive damages do not serve a compensatory purpose,
but rather are awarded on account of the defendant's egregious
conduct and serve to punish and deter the wrongdoer. 6
Kemp considered the taxation of punitive damages received in
connection with an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.362
The decision followed the analysis of the Tax Court in Burke.63
In a well-reasoned and carefully considered opinion, O'Gilvie
assessed the tax consequences of punitive damages received in a
wrongful death action. The court reviewed the earlier cases con-
sidering taxation of punitive damages and distinguished those hold-
ing punitive damages excludable from income under section
104.2 In addition, the court rejected an argument by the
taxpayer that the 1989 amendment to section 104(a) indicates that
the law prior to the amendment excluded punitive damages from
income. 6 The court construed the exclusion narrowly, holding
that the punitive damages were not received "'on account of per-
sonal injury," and were therefore includible in gross income.
VIII. THE CURRENT STATUS OF SECTION 104(A)(2)
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,36 amended
proven. See supra text accompanying notes 72-84.
358. 771 F. Supp. 357 (N.D.Ga. 1991).
359. Civ. A. No. 90-1075-B, 1992 WL 123,806 (D.Kan. May 26, 1992).
360. O'Gilvie, 1992 WL 123,806 at *4; Kemp, 771 F. Supp. at 359.
361. O'Gilvie, 1992 WL 123,806 at *2; Kemp, 771 F. Supp. at 359.
362. Kemp, 771 F. Supp. at 358.
363. Kemp, 771 F. Supp. at 358.
364. O'Gilvie, 1992 WL 123,806 at *2-3.
365. Id at *4. See infra text accompanying notes 376-82.
366. O'Gilvie, 1992 WL 123,806 at *4.
367. Pub. L. No. 101-239, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7641, 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989).
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section 104(a) to provide that "[p]aragraph (2) [of section 104(a)]
shall not apply to any punitive damages [received] in connection
with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness."'
Despite its brevity, the legislative history of the amendment is
illuminating. As originally introduced, the amendment would have
limited the section 104(a)(2) exclusion to cases involving physical
injury or physical sickness.' The report of the House Ways and
Means Committee explained the purpose of the change:
Courts have interpreted this exclusion [section 104(a)(2)]
broadly in some cases to cover awards for personal injury
that do not relate to a physical injury or sickness. For
example, some courts have held that the exclusion applies
to damages in cases involving employment discrimination
and injury to reputation where there is no physical injury
or sickness.
... The committee believes that such treatment is
inappropriate where no physical injury or sickness is in-
volved.37
The conference agreement approved a less sweeping change. It
limited the section 104(a)(2) exclusion so that only punitive damag-
es awarded in cases not involving physical injury or sickness
would be specifically eliminated. 7' The Conference Committee
report merely restated that the exclusion for damages received for
personal injury "shall not apply to any punitive damages in con-
nection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sick-
heS " 3 72
ness."3
The Ways and Means Committee report reflects the House's
view courts were not according proper tax treatment to proceeds
received on account of nonphysical injury. 3' The House probably
reasoned, but failed to articulate, that employment discrimination
368. Id. § 7641(a), 103 Stat. at 2379.
369. H.R. REP No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.1355 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2825. The House version of the bill would have amended § 104(a)(2)
by inserting "in a case involving physical injury or physical sickness" after "on account
of personal injuries or sickness." Id. The amendment would have applied to damages re-
ceived after July 10, 1989, except those received pursuant to a binding written agreement
or court decree issued or in effect on or before July 10, 1989. Id
370. Id at 1354-55, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2824-25.
371. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, § 7641, 103 Stat. at 2379.
372. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6233 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018, 3226.
373. See H.R. REP. No. 247 at 1355, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2825.
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suits are primarily contractual in nature rather than tortious and,
thus, are beyond the scope of the section 104(a)(2) exclusion. 74
This supposition was recently confirmed in Burke, which held that
awards in Title VII cases are not excluded by section 104(a). 375
Similarly, the tax cases involving awards for libel all had a sub-
stantial business aspect to them. Consequently, the House appears
to have concluded that courts were improperly characterizing those
damages as personal and, thus, excludable by section 104(a)(2).
In O'Gilvie v. United States, the taxpayer argued that the 1989
amendment to section 104(a)(2) added meaning to the pre-amend-
ment statute.376 The taxpayer claimed that the amendment was
meaningless unless punitive damages had been excluded from in-
come prior to it. If punitive damages were not excluded, the
amendment would merely restate, in part, the existing law.3"
Therefore, the taxpayer reasoned, the amendment "reflects a con-
gressional judgment to partially limit the scope of section
104(a)(2)... 37
The O'Gilvie court rejected the taxpayer's interpretation of the
amendment. It noted that since punitive damages were not consid-
ered income until the decision in Glenshaw Glass in 1955, Con-
gress did not consider punitive damages when it enacted the prede-
cessor to section 104(a)(2).379 In addition, the court did not find
the legislative history of the 1989 amendment supportive of the
taxpayer's position.380
While the court reached the proper conclusion, its assertion that
punitive damages were not considered income until 1955 is not
supported by either legislative history or early judicial decision.
Enactment of the original exclusion for personal injury damages
reflects the concern of the 1918 Congress about taxation of com-
pensatory damages.81 Congressional silence with respect to puni-
tive damages when enacting the statutory exclusion does not pro-
vide support for the court's presumption. Such a presumption is
374. See Burke & Friel, supra note 136, at 24 (discussing the definitional limitations of
section 104(a)(2) to personal injuries analogous to torts and excluding contracts).
375. Burke v. United States, 60 U.S.L.W. 4404, 4407 (U.S. May 26, 1992), rev'g 929
F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991).
376. Civ. A. No. 90-1075-B, 1992 WL 123,806 at *4 (D.Kan. May 26, 1992).
377. Id
378. Id
379. Id
380. Id
381. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
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dubious in light of the evolving definition of "income." Moreover,
in Hawkins v. Commissioner, the first case to address the taxation
of damages awarded in a personal injury action, the court specifi-
cally reserved judgment on the issue of punitive damages.382
Although the 1989 amendment appears unambiguous, it leaves
several important questions unanswered. The 1989 amendment does
not address, and thus fails to resolve, the taxation of punitive dam-
ages awarded in cases involving physical injury. 3 Following the
rule of statutory construction requiring that exemptions from in-
come not be inferred but proven unambiguously, the tax status of
punitive damages awarded for physical injuries remains open for
further legislative clarification or judicial decision .3' The Fourth
Circuit decision in Miller and the Kemp and O'Gilvie decisions
strongly support the proposition that such damages are not exclud-
ed from gross income.
A number of commentators have reasoned by negative impli-
cation that even if punitive damages awarded for physical injuries
were not to be excluded from income under section 104(a)(2) prior
to the 1989 amendment, they are to be excluded since the change
in that provision. 38" The Service also appears to have adopted in-
formally this interpretation. In two publications, the Service advises
taxpayers that punitive damages awarded in cases not involving
physical injury or sickness are taxable.386 The obvious implication
is that ppnitive damages awarded in cases involving physical inju-
ries are not taxable. This position unfortunately represents an un-
warranted return to the analytic errors marked by Revenue Ruling
75-45.387
Furthermore, the 1989 amendment is ambiguous with respect to
the situation it did address, taxation of punitive damages awarded
in "a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness." 388
A hypothetical illustrates the ambiguity. First, assume that a tax-
382. 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1024-25 (1927). For a discussion of Hawkins, see supra text ac-
companying notes 149-56.
383. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641.
384. Mark W. Cochran, 1989 Tax Act Compounds Confusion Over Tax Status of Per-
sonal Injury Damages, 49 TAX NOTES 1565 (December 31, 1990).
385. See sources cited supra note 32.
386. I.R.S. PUB. 525, supra note 33, at 15; I.R.S. PUB. 17, supra note 33, at 77.
387. See supra text accompanying notes 254-65.
388. I.R.C. § 104(a), as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-239, § 7641.
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payer (T) was libeled by the defendant (D). T alleged and received
$1,000,000 of actual damages and $5,000,000 of punitive damages.
Since the 1989 amendment, the punitive damages are includible in
gross income. Assume, however, that in addition to the damage
done to T's reputation, T suffers an ulcer as a result of the libel.
Congress' intent clearly was to tax the punitive damages received
in connection with a non-physical personal injury. 89 But what
about the punitive damages attributable to the physical manifesta-
tion of the tortious conduct?
The House report accompanying the 1989 amendment provided
that the origin of the claim, physical or nonphysical, governs the
treatment of the punitive damages.39 "If an action has its origin
in a physical injury or physical sickness, then all damages that
flow therefrom are treated as payments involving physical injury or
physical sickness. 39' The legislative history thus defines the
statute's use of the word "involving" as meaning "originating
with." According to this construction of the statute, T, the hypo-
thetical taxpayer, would have to include the punitive damages in
income because the origin of the claim, libel, is nonphysical.
In contrast, the plain meaning of "involving" suggests that all
of punitive damages are to be excluded from income if any part of
the underlying claim relates to physical injuries. "Involving" means
to "include" 39' and, as such, it does not encompass an
"originating with" definition.
Moreover, the argument for giving "involving" its plain mean-
ing is reinforced by the statute's use of the word "case." "Case'
arguably encompasses all of the causes of actions alleged by the
parties. Thus, "a case not involving physical injury or physical
sickness" means an action which alleges no claim for physical
injury or sickness.
If Congress in fact intended to limit the exclusion for punitive
damages to those cases originating with a claim for physical injury,
it could have adopted such language specifically. For example, had
the statute provided that the exclusion for punitive damages would
389. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
390. H.R. REP. No. 247 at 1355, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2825.
391. Id. The report also provided that "[n]o allocation of damages is required among
multiple claims if more than one type of claim is alleged in a personal injury action." Id
392. This portion of the article borrows from Paul C. Feinberg, The Omnibus Recon-
ciliation Act of 1989 Provides That Punitive Damages Received In Personal Injury Case
Not Involving Physical Injury or Sickness Are Includible in Income, 14 CONNECTICUT BAR
ASSOCIATION TAX SECTION NEWSLETTER I (Sept. 30, 1990).
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not apply in 'a case not brought on account of a physical injury or
physical sickness' or in 'a case not originating out of a physical
injury or physical sickness,' the more narrow construction suggest-
ed by the House report would be easier to defend.
The plain meaning interpretation of the 1989 amendment is
also supported by one very early authority. In Solicitor's Memo-
randum 1384,393 the Service considered the taxation of damages
received by the taxpayer for the alienation of his wife's affection.
At that time, the Service held that the predecessor to section
104(a)(2) excluded only damages received for physical injuries.39
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Memorandum contained the
following statement:
However, even though the alienation of a wife's affec-
tions be not regarded as such a personal injury as is con-
templated by the statute, it is still possible that damages
therefor might be measured in part by sickness resulting
therefrom and, of course, the amount received on account
of such sickness would be exempt under the express lan-
guage of the statute.395
Thus, the Memorandum tends to support the conclusion that a
physical manifestation of a nonphysical injury would be sufficient
to avoid the limitation of the 1989 amendment on excluding puni-
tive damages from income.
CONCLUSION
The taxation of punitive damages has a long and involved
history. A proper analysis of section 104(a)(2) requires a return to
its origin. Congress enacted the earliest version of the section
104(a)(2) exclusion in response to uncertainty about the taxation of
payments made as compensation for personal injury. Because puni-
tive damages do not compensate victims for their injuries, such
damages should not be excluded from income. To resolve any
confusion which continues with respect to punitive damages, Con-
gress should further amend section 104 stating clearly this rule.
393. Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920). See also supra text accompanying notes 149-
61.
394. Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. at 71.
395. Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
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